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Abstract 
Purpose: As an essential component of Islamic governance for ensuring religious compliance, Shari’ah 
Annual Reports (SARs) play an important role in providing communication between Shari’ah Board (SB) 
members and stakeholders. This research, hence, aims at determining the ethical disclosure in SARs to 
identify how close the Shari’ah disclosure to the standards set by AAOIFI and also substantive morality of 
Islam. The research also aims to examine the factors determining disclosure performance.  
Design/Methodology/Approach: Two disclosure indices are developed to generate data from the SARs: (i) 
the AAOIFI standards for Shari’ah governance index for form related approach, (ii) an Islamic ethicality 
augmented index reflecting on substantive morality approach. The sample consists of 41 Islamic banks from 
15 different countries for the period of 2007-2014. Sampled 305 SARs were examined through disclosure 
analysis in line with the two indices developed for this study. An econometric analysis was run to identify 
the factors determining disclosure performance.  
Findings: The findings suggest that AAOIFI guidelines have an influence on the level of disclosure, even if 
Islamic banks have not adopted them. However, the level of disclosure for the ethically augmented index is 
found to be very limited with reliance on general statements in most of the cases. As part of determining 
factors, the popularity of Shari’ah scholars is significant for both indices, while the existence of an internal 
Shari’ah auditing department holds some explanatory power. The adoption of AAOIFI standards at the 
country level, the regulatory quality and the duration of Shari’ah compliance are particularly deterministic 
factors in terms of complying with AAOIFI standards for SARs.  
Originality/Value: Although Shari’ah Board is the most crucial division of corporate governance in Islamic 
banks in terms of securing the ‘Islamic’ identity of these institutions, their most important communication 
instrument, namely, SAR, has not been explored sufficiently, alongside an insufficient attempt to constitute 
ICG. Initially, this study attempted to constitute an Islamic corporate governance framework as a theoretical 
construct which provides context for the empirical part of the research, and this should be considered a novel 
approach. Secondly, the empirical part of the research aims to fill the gap observed in the literature, such as 
small sample size and index construction related matters. This research is conducted with a larger sample 
size as compared to the available studies in the literature, and it has developed two indices for disclosure 
analysis along with developing Islamic morality-based index beside an index based on AAOIFI standards. 
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Corporate governance (CG) has been an emerging topic of study highlighted by an increased 
interest during the last decade mainly due to its essential role in the financial system and the 
globalisation of the economy. By playing a crucial role in the working mechanisms of the 
economy, analyses and explorations of CG from different perspectives have emerged, offering 
types of corporate governance systems – including outsider and insider systems - (Dignam and 
Galanis, 2016), information disclosure (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012) and the role of CG in 
bank failures (Berger et al., 2016).  
With the emergence of  Islamic banks (IBs) following the 1970s, CG models in conventional 
systems were studied from an Islamic perspective to explore possible conformity with Islamic 
principles and viability in IBs with the objective of locating and/or developing a distinctive GC 
structure for these institutions in line with Islamic operational principles (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; 
Choudhury and Hoque, 2006; Muneeza and Hassan, 2014). Although IBs’ CG is similar to the 
conventional CG in its structural and functional nature, an essentialisation of Islamic norms, 
values and forms, as part of its construct, makes Islamic Corporate Governance (ICG) distinct, 
particularly, in terms of Shari’ah governance and accounting practices with a specific emphasis 
on a holistic approach intrinsic to Islam, articulated through transparency, environmental 
concerns, the rights of stakeholders and social justice (Choudhury and Hoque, 2004; Kamla et 
al., 2006; Kamla, 2009; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2011; El-Halaby and Hussainey, 2015). Thus, 
despite the fact that a majority of the IBs follow shareholder CG in their operation, tempered 
by some twists of Shari’ah compliancy ameliorated via the input of Islamic law or fiqh due to 
the realism of market conditions, ICG is considered to be a product of Islamic Moral Economy 
(IME) by essentialising the substantive morality inherent within  Islam in relation to 
incorporating the larger stakeholders’ interests. 
Implementation of Islamic norms and values in the IBs essentialises the ‘Islamic identity’ of 
these institutions, which renders them as a separate sector, namely, the Islamic banking sector, 
within the existing capitalist financial system. However, the practice evidences that convincing 
the customers of Shari’ah compliance of IBs is more important for them than providing 
Shari’ah compliant products and services or managing the IBs in line with the normative 
expectations of the ICG principles. In order to assure Shari’ah compliance of an IB, as well as, 
its products, services and operations, and ensure customers’ trust in  Shari’ah compliance, IBs 
incorporate Shari’ah Boards (SB), an institution of larger ICG, in various forms and titles, as 
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a distinct division compared to conventional CG (Malkawi, 2013). Thus, ICG has been 
relegated to the operation of SBs in a functional sense before even attempting to constitute the 
ICG, as IBs aim to secure efficiency by only adopting elements of a form-based Islamisation, 
thereby, ensuring Shari’ah compliancy at the expense of ICG’s essentialised objective of equity 
and stake-holding. 
The SB constitutes one of the most important and distinguishing features of ICG in IBs. The 
role of a SB is to assure that operations undertaken by IBs comply with Shari’ah rules and 
principles through directing, reviewing and supervising activities within an IB (Malkawi, 
2013). To provide customers with confidence in the Shari’ah compliance of products and 
services offered by IBs, as the AAOIFI (the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic 
Financial Institutions) standards identify, SBs are expected to issue an annual Shari’ah 
compliance report to disclose the necessary information to assure stakeholders that the 
operations of IBs are conducted according to Shari’ah rules and principles. Although a SB’s 
annual report provides the most important intermediary between the SB and stakeholders, the 
extent of disclosure by SBs varies among the IBs considerably being determined by individual 
SB’s efforts and transparency.  As a standard setting body for Shari’ah compliancy in Islamic 
financial institutions, the AAOIFI does not possess enforcement powers while their standards 
are form or fiqh oriented rather than reflecting the substantive morality of Islam. 
In order to fill the identifiable gaps in the literature, the study explores SAR disclosure levels 
and performance of Islamic banks through an index developed by virtue of the application of 
AAOIFI standards in relation to Shari’ah governance. In addition, as mentioned above, this 
study adopts a critical approach towards evaluating AAOIFI standards and constructs a more 
demanding and extended index based on an ICG framework developed through the ethical 
positioning of IME. This is rationalised on the grounds that IBs’ Islamic compliance should not 
be limited to ‘legal and form’ matters, and should also integrate ‘substance,’ as Islam promotes 
a comprehensive and integrated view of the world. Thus, Islamic morality augmented index 
essentialises a more detailed level of disclosure due to its emphasis on ethical outcomes, such 
as, transparency, along with other features based on the substantive morality argument of IME. 
This constitutes a significant and critical conceptual contribution by this study to the existing 
body of knowledge. Consequently, this research examines the content of SARs and their level 
of disclosure for 41 Islamic banks from 15 different countries for the period of 2007-2014, by 
applying two different indices.  
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An econometric analysis of SARs is conducted by examining the factors affecting such 
disclosure through analysing bank level and country level variables, through the disclosure data 
generated from the sampled banks. The empirical contribution is also significant as this study 
provides the largest sample size for SAR-based disclosure analysis available in the literature 
along with examining data generated through two different sets of indices. Finally, a brief 
qualitative analysis of SAR reports is attempted to render further evidence qualifying the 
Shari’ah governance issues affecting IBs. 
The rest of the paper flows as follows: Section 2 presents a literature review by referring to the 
empirical studies available on the theme, while Section 3 provides a critical discussion on 
essentialising a distinctive CG, namely ICG, which aims at rationalising an extended index 
based on IME used in this study. Section 4 discusses variables and hypothesis development, 
while Section 5 presents the methodology of the study and data generation. In section 6, the 
empirical findings of disclosure and regression analysis are presented, and Section 7 culminates 
with the concluding remarks.  
2. Rationalising the Study 
The existing body of knowledge demonstrates that the literature regarding the good governance 
and ethical disclosure, as an articulation of it, is growing in size and quality, particularly after 
the corruption scandals of big corporations (e.g. Enron) and failures of banks (e.g. Lehmann 
Brothers). Elmagrhi et al. (2016), for instance, explored the UK publicly listed firms during 
the post-financial crisis period (2008-2013) in terms of their compliance with the good 
governance principles and to what degree they disclose such information. Their findings 
suggest that the firms differ in fulfilling the requirements and disclosure of good governance, 
which can be attributed to several factors such as board size, independent outside directors and 
director diversity. A similar study was conducted by Jizi et al. (2014) to investigate the level of 
CSR disclosure of large US commercial banks following the financial crisis (2009-2011) to 
reveal the impact of corporate governance through particular characteristics on disclosure level. 
They also find that independent boards of directors and larger board size have a positive 
influence on the level of disclosure. Similar studies to analyse the corporate governance 
features of IBs and the level of their disclosure are also conducted (see: Azam et al., 2019; 
Dalwag et al., 2015; Ghosh, 2017; Nawaz, 2017; Shehata, 2015). However, the existent paucity 
of literature indicates that most of the available studies regarding the disclosure of IBs neglect 
to analyse SARs issued by SBs and mostly focus on the level and determinants of disclosure 
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of CSR or other aspects of CG in IBs (see: Al-Baluchi, 2006; Darmadi, 2013; Farook et al., 
2011; Hameed and Sigit, 2005; Rahman et al., 2010; Hassan and Harahap, 2010; Aribi and 
Gao, 2010; Mallin et al., 2014).  
As a peculiar feature of corporate governance in IBs, investigation of SAR is crucial from both 
good governance and IME perspectives. Literature, where it exists, focusing on the level of 
disclosure in SARs is scarce and rudimentary. For instance, Md Rahin (2009) analyses 
disclosures on the SBs by only investigating their existence without examining the contents of 
the SARs. Nonetheless, some researchers aimed to fill this gap: Haniffa and Hudaib (2007), 
for instance, incorporated SB related disclosures in annual reports of IBs, including, but not 
limited to, some SAR components as dimensions into their ethical identity index with a sample 
of seven IBs.  Although the Shari’ah Board dimension to their study includes only 11 index 
items, only three out of seven SBs were found to be communicative with an average above 
50% for the three-year sample period.   
In a country-level study, Ibrahim and Hameed (2009) examined the SARs of IBs deploying a 
sample from Malaysia, Bahrain and Pakistan in 2005 and 2006. Though his study does not 
employ a disclosure index, they report a big gap in disclosure levels between SARs of Pakistani 
and Malaysian IBs, with Pakistani IBs being the most comprehensive in contrast to those of 
Malaysia.  
In a more detailed analysis of SARs compared to offerings by Ibrahim and Hameed (2009), 
Abdullah et al. (2013) investigate disclosures by the SBs of 23 IBs from Malaysia and 
Indonesia by employing a modified version of the disclosure index proposed by Maali et al. 
(2006). Although research by Abdullah et al. (2013) is more detailed compared to Ibrahim and 
Hameed’s (2009), their study was limited to only two countries. Subsequent results 
demonstrate that SB-related disclosure performance of the sampled banks is very limited, 
which is true even for the disclosure of sensitive and highly necessary information. As for the 
factors affecting disclosure related SBs, cross-membership with other SBs and the expertise of 
SB members in finance-related subjects proved influential (Abdullah et al., 2013).  
In his detailed analysis of  Shari’ah governance in Malaysia, GCC and the UK, Hasan (2012) 
also examined SARs as part of a Shari’ah governance framework using a sample of SARs 
published in the 2007 and 2008 annual reports of several Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs), 
albeit not in depth. In his questionnaire-based study, Hasan (2012) demonstrates drastically 
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low scores regarding the disclosure of duties and services of the SB: 45% of IFIs in Malaysia 
and 11.1% of IFIs in GCC countries disclosed information about duties and services. The study 
shows that these scores decrease further when the disclosure of the SB activities are concerned 
(5% of IFIs in Malaysia and 7.4% of IFIs in GCC countries, and none of the IFIs in the UK). 
Based on these scores, Hasan (2012) concludes that the majority of IFIs in Malaysia, GCC 
countries and the UK did not operate according to the AAOIFI format for SARs.  
In a recent and comprehensive study, El-Halaby and Hussainey (2016) examined the disclosure 
practice of 43 IBs that adopted AAOIFI standards for the year 2013. They explored the 
Shari’ah Supervisory Board’s disclosure in addition to CSR and financial disclosures. 
Although their study is not exclusively centred on SARs, as the authors claim, it is the most 
comprehensive analysis of SARs based on AAOIFI guidelines. They found a relatively high 
disclosure level (68%) based on an index in which age, size and existence of the internal 
Shari’ah department proved to have a significant impact on such levels of disclosure, along 
with SSB characteristics.  
As the discussion suggests, although a SB is the most crucial division of CG in IBs in terms of 
securing the ‘Islamic’ identity of these institutions, their most important communication 
instrument, namely, SAR, has not been explored sufficiently, alongside an insufficient attempt 
to constitute ICG. There are three important gaps in the literature in terms of exploring and 
examining SARs: small sample size and inadequate index construction. Regarding the small 
sample size, studies conducted to date, contend with mostly one or two years of analysis, which 
hinder the opportunity to observe changes in the level of disclosure in SARs throughout the 
sampled years. Furthermore, the sampled IBs have been selected from a small number of 
countries aside from El-Halaby and Hussainey’s (2016) study, which extends the study to eight 
countries but considers only one year.  
The second important gap is the index construction, as the discussed studies either explored 
SARs with a small number of index items, or at best, with extended index items, limited to 
AAOIFI standards. In other words, the indices have been constructed on the assumption that 
AAOIFI standards regarding the SARs provide the best practice, since it is assumed that 
AAOIFI represents the main standard-setting body.  
This brings the issue of the third important gap, namely, available studies only focus on the 
AAOIFI standards, which are developed according to market conditions through the 
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application of a realist methodology based on a fiqhi consideration of Islamisation. In other 
words, Islamic norms have been grafted to allow the expectations of the market system 
prevailing in Islamic banks. This study, therefore, goes beyond this frame by developing the 
principles of a theoretical construction of an ICG within the normative principles of Islamic 
morality whereby the existing literature is expanded through a critical approach. This paper, 
hence, aims to respond to these identified gaps in furthering the existing body of knowledge. 
3. Islamic Corporate Governance Framework and Shari’ah Boards 
Although conventional CG theories have been instrumental in explaining practices in the 
mainstream sector, they do not necessarily fit into an Islamic CG frame due to prevailing 
difference in approaches towards human nature, the source of legitimacy and stakeholders 
emerging from ontological disparities. Therefore, a distinctive ICG developed within an IME 
theoretical framework is required so that the CG of IBs articulates Islamic ethics in their 
everyday application. As mentioned, in current practice the focus has only been placed on 
compliance related to financial transactions, while Islam’s operational impact on the remaining 
elements of running an organisation is not conceptualised.  
Existing Shari’ah compliance relates solely to form in muamalat or financial transactions, 
while Islamic ethics or substance should prevail in transactions as well as running of the 
organisation, taking the form of corporate governance. This can overcome the inconsistency 
observed in the IB industry, by demonstrating that where the financial operations of an IB are 
made Shari’ah compliant, by definition and nature of its structure, the governance of such an 
organisation should also be Islamic. In other words, ‘Islamic’ in an IB should have governance 
implications beyond financial transactions when articulating Islam’s comprehensive normative 
world encompassing all aspects of life. Such a critical perspective, thereby, rationalises the 
necessity and emergence of ICG through the specific normative world of Islam, as having the 
transactions of IBs Islamic, while their governance representing the universal values creates 
incoherence. In a similar attempt, for example, Koleva (2020) rather than applying the 
universally accepted CSR checklist to determine the CSR performance of IBs, she has 
developed an authentic CSR frame and its constituents through the normative worldview of 
Islam. This paper, hence, aims to overcome the observed gap in developing an authentic ICG 
frame beyond hybridising the universal models to develop an ICG frame, as detailed below.   
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Many researchers in the field of Islamic economics have attempted to establish the 
philosophical and conceptual foundations of IME to provide its coherent theoretical framework  
(henceforth IPE), such as, Ahmad (1979, 1994, 2004), Chapra (1992, 2000), Naqvi (1981, 
2013), Siddiqi (1981), Sirageldin (2000) and Asutay (2007, 2013). IME is articulated through 
the application of some foundational axioms which can help to define and determine the norms, 
nature and structure of ICG. Building on such literature, we define these foundational axioms 
as follows: 
The first principle of ICG relates to the ontological core of Islamic teaching and refers to the 
unitary and complementarity nature of Islamic knowledge and existence that is tawhid (God’s 
oneness and sovereignty (Asutay, 2007, 2012; Khan, 2012). Accordingly, ICG within IME 
frame and substance essentialises the interests and rights of all stakeholders and necessitates a 
balance between such rights and responsibilities, as well as, considering their priorities as 
derived from ontological and epistemological sources. This is further substantiated through 
applying other axioms, such as rububiyah and tazkiyah. 
In identifying the objective of the functioning of organisations, rububiyyah refers to “divine 
arrangements for nourishment, sustenance and directing things towards their perfection” 
(Ahmad, 1979: 12), namely, signposting a divinely constructed developmentalist path. This 
implies that the governance of organisations including corporate governance of financial 
organisations should be designed to allow all the stakeholders to develop their potential 
(Asutay, 2013). 
Tazkiyah (purification and harmony) is “concerned with growth towards perfection through 
purification of attitudes and relationships” (Ahmad, 1994: 20) implying growth in harmony. 
For corporate governance this implies that individuals and other stakeholders are expected to 
grow without creating imbalances between the interests of all the involved stakeholders 
according to their perfection via fitrah, as identified through the rububiyah axiom (Asutay, 
2013). However, the scope of tazkiyah is not limited to individuals but also encompasses 
organisations and society.  
In constituting the ICG frame, the next principle is al-’adl (justice) which provides practical 
guidelines for the sustenance of all the things based on the ontological sources of Islam. For 
ICG, this means granting the right to whom it belongs, with the rights of all entities being 
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defined in Islam. Thus, corporations and organisations are expected to establish their 
relationships with all the stakeholders within a framework of justice (Asutay, 2013). 
In expanding the nature of ICG in terms of socialisation, the principle of al-ihsan (beneficence), 
complements al-adl (justice) to achieve higher goals in terms of moral values through which 
‘good society’ is aimed at. It refers to a paradigm in which those who are better off are expected 
to contribute to the betterment of worse offs so that equilibrium can be achieved in the society 
(Asutay, 2012, 2013). This implies that organisations, including corporations, should also 
ensure the expansion of ihsani social capital through their direct engagement with the society 
in which they operate. 
ICG, as the articulation of these axioms, aims to realise the objectives of Shari’ah (maqasid 
al-Shari’ah), which is defined as ‘the well-being of all the stakeholders’, which produces falah 
or salvation as the outcome of the process.  
An ICG understanding is, therefore, crucial for IBs so that consistency can be achieved within 
these institutions since, by definition, the working mechanism or the governance of IBs should 
be determined by the same ontological paradigm that defines their operations. In other words, 
having their financial instruments achieving Shari’ah compliance is not enough, as IME has to 
determine the nature of their existence and governance so that tawhid’s complementarity can 
also be achieved in the integral working and governance of an organisation. 
A crucial component of ICG is Shari’ah governance determined by IME’s substantive morality 
through which IBs secure that the operations within IBs comply with Islamic law, whereby, 
they prove to their customers that they are legitimate according to Shari’ah. The most 
important unit in Shari’ah governance is SB, which is composed of Shari’ah scholars who are 
knowledgeable in Islamic law while the mechanisms of economics and finance are charged 
with the duty of achieving the forms and substance requirements implicit within an IME. The 
main responsibilities of a SB are (i) the provision of legal opinions based on Islamic law; (ii) 
control and review of the operations within the company to monitor the Shari’ah compliance 
of the firm; and, (iii) preparation of contracts (Banaga et al, 1994; Hassan, 2012). A SB 
constitutes the core department which renders the Islamic identity of these institutions. As 
Ibrahim et al. (2009: 233) also evidence, demand for IB institutions stem from offering halal 
or Islamically legitimate, products and services, as more than 95% of the respondents suggested 
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that “compliance with Shari’ah law is a fundamental requirement in terms of ‘halal’ type of 
investment and investment structure”.  
Since the role of Shari’ah scholars in IBs as an institution of an ICG framework is to ensure 
and demonstrate that IBs are legitimate institutions according to a Shari’ah frame and operate 
within an IPE framework with the objective of fulfilling the ethical expectations of an IME. 
Therefore, the ICG system demands that SARs of SBs should provide the necessary disclosure 
to convince all the stakeholders, particularly customers, of not only form oriented partial 
compliance but also moral compliance.  
This study considers that while AAOIFI based CG and Shari’ah governance is an important 
step in the right direction in shaping the operations of Islamic banks. However, as discussed so 
far, it also argues that Shari’ah compliance should not be relegated to a form-oriented 
understanding in mimicking conventional practice, but rather IBs must also develop their 
operations and governance within ICG to ensure they have substantive morality related 
compliance as well. In other words, it is argued that AAOIFI uses conventional institutional 
logic and Islamises it with Islamic law or a fiqh based form-oriented approach implying 
grafting process, rather than shaping the financial institutions according to Islamic morality as 
expressed by IME within IPE.  
It is important to note that despite the AAOIFI standards are grafted through the market 
conditions to ensure Shari’ah compliance within the market system. Many countries where 
Islamic finance has significant presence have avoided adopting the AAOIFI standards for their 
Islamic banking sector, as they want to remain loyal to the universally accepted international 
standards. This is also because adoption and requirements are not clearly identified which 
prevents common use of the AAOIFI standards by countries with systematic presence of 
Islamic banking and finance. 
Consequently, after identifying the substantive morality nature of ICG in this section, in order 
to identify the distinctions, this study constitutes two sets of indices in examining the 
communicated information in the SAR of IBs. The first one Shari’ah Disclosure Index (SDI), 
namely SDIAAOIFI relates to AAOIFI standards on Shari’ah governance, while the second one, 
SDIICG, relates to further ethical compliance required by ICG, so that a consistent and 
integrated approach should be developed, as the latter aims to articulate the normative 
requirements of IME in the operations of IBs. Such a frame is expected to reveal the 
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‘Islamicity’ by further emphasising Islamic ethicality in IBs operations beyond legal forms. 
The following sections explore published SARs as part of the annual reports of the sampled 
IBs with the intention of revealing to what extent Shari’ah scholars fulfil this mission of 
essentialising the substantive morality of Islam or consider the extent to which they remain 
within a fiqhi or Islamic rational law’s comfort zone.  
4. Variables and Hypothesis Development  
In order to determine the factors affecting the level of disclosure in SARs, SDIICG and SDIAAOIFI 
are used as dependent variables to assess the impact of country-level and bank-level factors.   
In modelling, 5 country-level and 12 bank-level control variables were utilised to measure the 
variation in the level of disclosure of SBs. In determining the control variables, the existing 
empirical papers, among others, Mollah and Zaman (2015) and Abedifar et al. (2013), were 
consulted. Table 1 provides a list of all independent variables utilised in this study.  
Table 1: List of Independent Variables 
Country Level Independent Variables Definition Source 
1 Regularity Quality Regulatory Quality  
Regulatory quality captures 
perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development. 
WGI Project 
2 Voice and Accountability Voice and Accountability  
Voice and accountability captures 
perceptions of the extent to which a 
country's citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, 
and a free media. 
WGI Project 
3 CPI Corruption Index Corruption is defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.  
Transparency International 
4 Is Country AAOIFI Adoption of AAOIFI   Adoption of AAOIFI Governance Standards at the country level.  
AAOIFI 
5 GDP Growth GDP Growth Rate The growth rate of GDP of a country. World Bank online system 
Bank Level Independent Variables 
6 LogSize Size Logarithm of total assets which is used as a proxy for size. 
The Banker Special Issue 
7 ROA  Profitability  Return on assets as a proxy for profitability. 
The Banker Special Issue 
8 Leverage Leverage 
Ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
which is used as a proxy for 
leverage. 
The Banker Special Issue 
9 Independent Auditor Type of Auditor 
Dummy variable is used to measure 
the impact if external auditor is one 
of Ernst & Young, Deloitte, 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers and 
KPMG. 
Annual Report 
10 Internal SAD  Existence of Sharia auditing department 
Dummy variable is used to measure 
the impact if IB has an internal 
Shari’ah auditing department. 
Annual Report 
11 Crisis Dummy  Crisis Dummy  
Dummy variable to locate year 2009 
as a break point to measure the 
impact of the financial crisis of 2007. 
Year 2009 
Sencal, Harun & Asutay, Mehmet (2021). Ethical Disclosure in the Shari’ah Annual Reports of Islamic Banks: 
Discourse on Shari’ah Governance, Quantitative Empirics and Qualitative Analysis. Corporate Governance. 
12 
 
12 Age of Shariah Age from Shari’ah Compliance 
Number of years passed since the 
Shari’ah compliant activities has 
started.  
Annual Report 
13 No of Members  Number of SB members Number of Shari’ah scholars in a SB in a particular year.  
Annual Report 
14 Average Education Average level of education of SB 
The variable is calculated by giving 
a score to each Shari’ah scholar in a 
SB (1 for undergraduate; 2 for 
master; and 3 for a PhD degree), and 
then calculating the average of the 
scores. 
Annual Report and  
Thomson Reuters Database  
15 Popularity Popularity of SB 
If a Shari’ah scholar in a SB has a 
place in the list provided by Unal 
(2010), we give a score of 1, and 0 
otherwise. Then, calculate the 
average of all scholars in a SB. 
Unal (2010)  
16 Board Size  Board Size Number of members in the Board of Directors. 
Annual Report 
17 CEO Duality  CEO Duality 
Dummy variable is used to measure 
the impact of CEO duality which is 
the case that CEO is also the 
chairman of the Board of Directors. 
Annual Report 
 
As displayed in Table 1, the first set of indicators are themed as ‘Regularity Quality and Voice 
and Accountability’, for which data were obtained from The Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) Project which is available online. In the literature, it is argued that higher regulatory 
quality requires greater transparency (Ernstberger and Grüning, 2013; Leuz et al., 2003). 
Therefore, it is expected that there should be a positive relationship between regulatory quality 
and the level of disclosure.  
As for the ‘voice and accountability dimension’ of WGI, it is suggested that a high level of 
voice and accountability leads to ability to pressurise public administrations to prevent 
corruption (Apaza, 2009), which is related to the level of disclosure as a method of preventing 
corruption through transparency (Wang et al., 2004). A high level of voice and accountability, 
thus, is expected to have a positive impact on disclosure levels of SBs. We hypothesise, 
therefore: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the regularity quality of the country and level 
of disclosure in SAR. 
H2: There is a positive relationship between voice and accountability of the country and 
level of disclosure in SAR. 
A ‘Corruption Index’ which is calculated and provided online by Transparency International is 
also included as an independent variable for the disclosure levels of SBs. This is because, as 
mentioned above, it is suggested that transparency through disclosure of information is a way 
Sencal, Harun & Asutay, Mehmet (2021). Ethical Disclosure in the Shari’ah Annual Reports of Islamic Banks: 
Discourse on Shari’ah Governance, Quantitative Empirics and Qualitative Analysis. Corporate Governance. 
13 
 
to tackle the problem of corruption (Wang et al., 2004), and, therefore, is expected to be related 
to a high level of disclosure. 
H3: There is a positive relationship between the corruption index score of the country and 
level of disclosure in SAR. 
Adoption of AAOIFI standards at the country level is another independent variable included in 
this study. As El-Halaby and Hussainey (2016) argued, formal adoption of AAOIFI standards 
increases the level of disclosure in SAR, since the adoption of these standards for IBs at the 
country level is expected to have a positive impact on the disclosure of SBs at firm-level. 
Currently, there are four countries in our sampled dataset which adopted AAOIFI standards at 
the national level, namely, Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan and Sudan.  
H4: The level of disclosure of SAR is expected to be higher in IBs located in countries which 
adopt AAOIFI standards than in countries that do not adopt AAOIFI. 
The last country-level variable is macro-economic factors, namely, ‘GDP growth,’ which is 
provided by the World Bank online system. Based on the empirical evidence provided by El-
Halaby and Hussainey (2015b) and Wong (2012), we expect that GDP growth has a positive 
relationship with the level of disclosure since the growth of the country should have a facilitator 
role in terms of disclosure practices. Therefore, we hypothesise that: 
H5: There is a positive relationship between GDP growth of the country and the level of 
disclosure in SAR. 
As for the bank-level control variables, 15 determinants are selected, which are explained 
below:  
Firstly, a bank-level indicator is the logarithm of total assets, which is used as a proxy for size. 
Size is included in the study since it is expected that as the size of the firm increases, the number 
of shareholders increases as well, who are concerned with the activities of the company 
(Cormier et al., 2005). In addition, larger firms would require to legitimise further their 
activities which leads to better disclosure practices (Brammer and Pavelin, 2004). Therefore, 
we hypothesise that: 
H6: SAR of large IBs are more likely to disclose more information than small IBs. 
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Although agency theory expects a positive relationship between the profitability and corporate 
disclosure with the objective of revealing the good performance of the agent with the 
shareholders (El-Halaby and Hussainey, 2016), the empirical findings in the literature on the 
impact of profitability of a firm on social disclosure is indecisive (Aras et al., 2010; Gray et 
al., 2001). We, therefore, included return on assets as a proxy for profitability to see if there is 
any relation between the level of disclosure of SB and profitability. Therefore, we hypothesise 
that: 
H7: There is an association between profitability and the level of disclosure. 
Leverage is another financial indicator of a company which, according to literature has a 
positive relationship with the level of disclosure (Jaggi and Low, 2000; Elshandidy et al., 2013; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This is because it is expected that the high level of disclosure will 
reduce the monitoring costs (El-Halaby and Hussainey, 2015b). Hence, we test as to whether 
high leverage in terms of the ratio of total liabilities to total assets has an impact on the 
disclosure of SBs. Therefore, we hypothesise that: 
H8: There is a positive relationship between the leverage of an IB and the level of disclosure 
in a SAR. 
Selection of an independent audit firm is also expected to have a positive association with the 
level of disclosure (Firth, 1979; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) since it provides credibility to the 
corporate, particularly in terms of financial status (El-Halaby and Hussainey, 2016). For this, 
a dummy variable is used to find out if hiring an auditing firm among four big companies, 
namely Ernst & Young, Deloitte, PWC and KPMG, has any explanatory power on an SDI 
score.   
H9: The level of disclosure of SAR is predicted to be higher in IBs audited by the Big 4 
auditors than in IBs that are audited by non-Big 4 auditors 
We also included the existence of an internal Shari’ah auditing department or unit in IB as an 
independent variable, since this department is directly related to the preparation of SB reports. 
In the literature, it is also empirically shown that there is a positive relationship between the 
existence of an internal auditing department and level of disclosure (Gordon and Smith, 1992; 
Schneider and Wilner, 1990). In order to determine the existence of an internal Shari’ah 
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auditing unit, we examined the annual reports to find direct proof of the existence of such a 
unit.  
H10: There is a positive relationship between the existence of internal Shari’ah Auditing 
Department of IB and level of disclosure in SAR. 
In order to discern the impact of the recent global financial crisis on the extent of disclosure, a 
crisis dummy variable is utilised. Since the impact of the crisis is expected to be reflected on 
the disclosure in a lagged manner not before the 2009 annual report, we selected 2009 and later 
as the crisis period. Haji and Ghazali (2012) empirically illustrated that voluntary disclosure 
has increased after the global financial crisis. Considering the reduced trust accorded to 
financial institutions after the crisis, voluntary disclosure positively influences the public image 
of a corporate body.  
H11: SAR of IBs after the crisis is more likely to disclose more information than a pre-crisis 
period. 
For the effect of experience in terms of Shari’ah compliance, the longevity or age of the IB is 
considered as an independent variable having an impact on the nature of corporate and Shari’ah 
disclosure. It is hypothesised that the old IBs should have a better disclosure mechanism due 
to the expected, established practices which are developed over the years. Furthermore, the 
older IBs are expected to incur less competitive disadvantage (El-Halaby and Hussainey, 2016). 
The positive relationship between the age and the level of disclosure is also shown in the 
literature empirically (Cormier et al., 2005; Hossain and Hammami, 2009), despite some 
exceptions (Alsaeed, 2006). Since a multicollinearity problem may arise in the case of 
including both the age of starting operations and being Shari’ah compliant, we only included 
age calculated from the year of Shari’ah compliance, as the age of the bank must be equal to 
the years elapsed since the beginning of Shari’ah compliance. 
H12: Older IBs are expected to disclose more information in SAR than younger IBs. 
In our analysis, we also evaluate characteristics of SBs, and further analyse attributes of SB 
members separately in order to identify the effects of these different attributes of Shari’ah 
scholars have on the extent of disclosure of SB’s annual reports, rather than using an index 
score for a SB as a whole, as Farook and Lanis (2007) did. Three main indicators, namely, the 
number of members in a SB, the average level of education of the members and average 
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popularity of members of the SB, are included. It is expected that if the number of members 
increases, the report should be more detailed since a higher size of the board might decrease 
the uncertainty and lack of information (Birnbaum, 1984), as well as, reduce the asymmetric 
information problem (Chen and Jaggi, 2000), thereby, disclose more information (El-Halaby 
and Hussainey, 2016). This is also true for the level of education due to familiarity with 
preparing written documents. This is because a higher level of education might result in a 
deeper understanding of the working mechanisms of IBs and disclosure procedure. As for the 
popularity of Shari’ah scholars, El-Halaby and Hussainey (2016) argued that due to a deep 
comprehension of modern banking and disclosure structures, popular Shari’ah scholars might 
disclose more information in the SARs. In order to measure the popularity of the members, we 
use the list published by Unal (Unal, 2011) which provides the top 20 scholars based on their 
overall positions in terms of the number of Shari’ah boards they have been sitting on. Unal 
(Unal, 2011) used the data available on 31 December 2010, which is the mid-point for the 
sample period of this study, and hence his estimation should be considered as relevant for this 
study, as Shari’ah scholarship in IBs represent a monopoly (Unal, 2011) and, therefore, there 
would hardly be any change in the identified positions in Unal (2011). If a Shari’ah scholar in 
the sampled banks has a place on this list, we give a score of 1, and 0 otherwise. Based on this, 
we hypothesise the followings: 
H13: There is a positive relationship between the size of an SSB and level of disclosure in a 
SAR. 
H14: There is a positive relationship between the average level of education of SB members 
and level of disclosure in a SAR. 
H15: There is a negative relationship between popularity of SB and level of disclosure in a 
SAR.  
The size of the board of directors is another variable explored in the literature in terms of its 
impact on the level of disclosure. As it is discussed in the size of a SB, a higher board size is 
expected to influence the disclosure positively (Birnbaum, 1984; Chen and Jaggi, 2000). 
However, the empirical findings are mixed. While some studies suggest that a large board size 
has a positive impact on level of disclosure due to potential availability of diversified expertise 
and opinions (Hidalgo et al., 2011; Gandia, 2008; Abeysekera, 2010; Allegrini and Greco 
2013), there are also studies which suggest a negative impact on level of disclosure due to 
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inefficiency and lack of supervision ability (Herman et al., 1981; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). 
Furthermore, there are empirical studies, such as Arcay and Vazquez (2005) and Prado-Lorenzo 
and Garcia-Sanchez (2010), that find an insignificant association between board size and level 
of disclosure. Following Samaha et al. (2015), therefore, we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
H16: There is an association between board size and level of disclosure in SAR. 
Although it is argued that independence of the chairman of the board of directors provides a 
better monitoring experience of the managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983), empirical evidence 
regarding the CEO duality is mixed (Samaha et al., 2015). Although some studies evidence a 
negative relationship between the level of disclosure and CEO duality (Allegrini and Greco 
2013; Li, 2008), there are studies which found either an insignificant or positive relationship. 
Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H17: There is an association between CEO duality and level of disclosure in SAR. 
After defining the econometrics specification and describing the variables, the next section 
presents the findings of disclosure analysis and regression analysis. 
5. Research Methodology  
This study generates qualitative data for disclosure analysis through the content analysis of 
SARs of the sampled Islamic banks as detailed in Section 5.1, while an econometric analysis 
is conducted to identify the factors determining the disclosure performance of the sampled 
Islamic banks (see Section 5.1). Furthermore, a critical qualitative reflection on the behaviours 
of SBs are provided through SARs in Section 6.2.  
5.1. Data Generation through Disclosure Analysis 
This research utilises SARs issued by IBs as secondary data in order to measure the extent of 
disclosure in relation to an index which is composed to represent best Shari’ah governance 
practice. Similar to other studies on accounting disclosure, this study employs a content 
analysis method and is designed as an exploratory case study. In this approach, published SARs 
are subjected to a disclosure index. The composed index for SARs can be found in Table 1, 
which implies that the best practice of SARs is expected to disclose information about the listed 
items. In utilising the constructed index, the existence of an index item in SARs, irrespective 
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of its length, is used to determine disclosure on that particular index item. It should be noted 
that in this analysis, headings in SARs are not included as a unit of analysis.  
Table 2: Disclosure Index Items 
1 Report has an appropriate title 
2 Report has been appropriately addressed 
3 Report has identified the purpose of the engagement (opening paragraph) 
4 Report has identified the nature of the work performed (scope paragraph) 
5 Report has identified the management's responsibility 
6 Independent judgment in carrying out its responsibilities is disclosed. 
7 The role and responsibilities of the board are disclosed. 
8 Confirmation that the SB has performed appropriate tests, procedures and review work as appropriate 
9 Confirmation that the transaction and dealings are in compliance with Shari'ah rules and principles - scope 
10 Treatment of all earnings realized from sources prohibited by Shari’ah is disposed to charitable causes-opinion 
11 Compliance of zakah calculation with Shari’ah is disclosed. -opinion 
12 Statement on the endorsed conformity of Shari’ah compliance is disclosed -Opinion 
13 Distribution of profits and losses comply with Shari’ah is disclosed. 
14 Report on the violations of Shari’ah compliance (if any) is disclosed. 
15 Period covered is disclosed 
16 Date the report as of the completion date of the review is disclosed 
17 Report signed by all members.  
18 The report is published in the annual report 
19 Report signed by chairman 
20 Names of members are disclosed. 
21 Name of the chairman is disclosed 
22 Pictures of members are disclosed 
23 Examination of product development ex ante is provided. 
24 Examination of product development ex post is provided. 
25 Holding meetings during the year is disclosed. 
26 The training information of the employees is disclosed. 
27 The Shari’ah auditing department in the bank is disclosed. 
28 SB adopted one of the standards as guidelines (AAOIFI or IFSB). 
29 Report discloses that the management supplies the Shari`ah board with complete, accurate and adequate information in a timely manner 
30 Holding meeting with BOD 
31 Number of meetings during the year is disclosed. 
32 Details of the training information of the employees is disclosed. 
33 Details of the violations of Shari’ah compliance (if any) is disclosed. 
34 Details of treatment of all earnings realized from sources prohibited by Shari’ah is disposed to charitable causes is disclosed 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, items 1-18 are constructed through AAOIFI standards for SARs. In 
constructing these index items, the AAOIFI Governance Standard for Islamic Financial 
Institutions No. 1: Shari’ah Supervisory Board: Appointment, Composition and Report is 
referred to (AAOIFI, 2010). In this standard, the content of a SAR provided by a SB is 
described. According to this standard, a SAR should be composed of seven parts: (i) The title 
of the report; (ii) The addressee of the report – addresses the intended recipients of the report; 
(iii) Opening paragraph – refers to the purpose of the engagement; (iv) Scope paragraph – 
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describes the scope of the work performed, clarifies the management’s responsibility towards 
Shari‘ah compliance, and confirms that the appropriate tests, procedures, and review were 
performed; (v) Opinion paragraph – states the extent of compliance of the institution with 
Shari’ah in its activities; (vi) Date of report – documents the period covered by the report and 
the date of issuance; (vii) SSB’s signature – presents the approval of members of the SB to the  
contents of the report (Ginena and Hamid, 2015: 353). The index items 1-18, therefore, are 
constructed in a way to include all requirements of this standard, even if they are trivial items, 
such as, ‘Report has an appropriate title’ (Item 1). The rest of the items, namely items 19-34, 
are included as part of the ICG model developed in the previous section as a best practice to 
quantify additional information, such as, details of general disclosures, including the details of 
violations of Shari’ah. Thus, the additional index items are developed through the available 
theoretical (as above) and empirical literature to locate the detailed aspects of the issues beyond 
the initial general items. In the construction of the expanded items in reflecting the substantive 
morality of Islam as expressed in ICG, disclosure analysis studies in the literature are also 
benefitted, such as, El-Halaby and Hussainey (2016) and Abdullah et al. (2013). 
As for the methodological process, reliability is one of the most important elements of content 
analysis (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). Regarding the reliability of the coded data and dataset, 
Milne and Adler (1999: 238) suggests that “the most usual ways in which this is achieved is 
by demonstrating the use of multiple coders and either reporting that the discrepancies between 
the coders are few, or that the discrepancies have been re-analysed and the differences 
resolved”. To evaluate the reliability of the content analysis conducted in this research, 
therefore, we employed two methods. Firstly, the analyst repeated the coding process again 
after ten months with a sample of 10% of the dataset (30 SAR). Secondly, the same sample 
was given to an independent coder to compare two outcomes with the original coded data. The 
index items of the Shari’ah disclosure index were explained to the independent coder, who was 
asked to assess the content of SAR and assign related scores. The outcome of the reliability 
test suggests that discrepancies between the coders are insignificant. Consequently, the 
reliability of the coding process was assured. 
In terms of locating the identified items or the information sought in the SARs, by scoring 
them, this study employed a dichotomous approach: the score is ‘1’ if the item is disclosed and 
0 otherwise. The total score that each SAR earned is calculated additively with equal weight 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). If an item is not relevant for a specific report, such as if there is 
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no violation of rules, the index item to disclose the details of a violation is considered not valid 
for that particular report; and hence, that item is not considered as part of the disclosure index, 
and therefore, it is removed from both numerator and denominator. 
Following the modified version of Haniffa and Hudaib’s (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007) equation, 
as below, this study presents the score of disclosure level in the form of an index, namely the 






       
where SDIj is the Shari’ah disclosure index for IBj and Xji is 1 if the item i is in the SAR of IBj 
is disclosed and 0 otherwise. The total score is, then, divided by the number of relevant 
disclosure items (as mentioned above, irrelevant items removed from calculation when the case 
arose), namely nj, which in this case is equivalent to 34 (the total number of index items), as in 
Table 1. After calculating the index value for each SAR of each IBs, the inferential analysis is 
considered to make sense of the results. For example, a higher index value means the SB report 
is closer to the best possible disclosure practice level. In other words, if the index value is closer 
to 1, a SB has successfully and effectively managed to use SAR to communicate with the 
stakeholders.  
In order to explore the impact of AAOIFI standards for SARs, as mentioned above, index items 1-
18 in Table 1 are constructed in line with the AAOIFI standards. SDIAAOIFI score, therefore, 
indicates to what degree SBs of IBs adopt AAOIFI standards in SARs. Such an indicator 
provides the influence of standardisation on the level of disclosure in SARs. Especially, since 
66% of the sampled IBs in this study are not obliged to follow AAOIFI standards, or SDIAAOIFI 
score also shows the impact of standardisation on disclosure.  
AAOIFI standards for SARs, however, demand the disclosure of information at a general level 
without providing details of activities regarding monitoring or supervising, such as a number 
of meetings or training of the staff, as well as, the details of violations of Shari’ah, if there are 
any. This is the reason why an additional 16 index items were included to construct a more 
general disclosure index which integrates the expectations of an IME framework, namely 
SDIICG, to explore to what degree SBs disclose information regarding the details of their 
activities and Shari’ah compliance of IBs beyond AAOIFI. Considering transparency as an 
(1) 
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important ingredient of IME, SDIICG score provides to what degree IBs proactively achieve 
such a dimension in their SARs.  
In composing the data, annual reports of 41 Islamic banks from 15 countries are examined in 
relation to the identified SDI to reveal the level of disclosure of SBs which are published 
between 2007 and 2014, making in total a collection of 305 SARs. It should be noted that due 
to the unavailability of 23 Shari’ah annual reports within the sample period, this study has a 
sample of 305 instead of 328 SARs. 
As for the sampled Islamic banks, the sampling is based on criteria that they were established 
in, or prior to 2007, and have published SARs, which are available online and produced in the 
English or Arabic language for the period of 2007-2014. 2007 is selected as the commencement 
period since the number of established IBs before 2007 decrease swiftly; hence, to prevent a 
further decline in the sample size 2007 was chosen. Since 2007 is also the initial period of the 
global financial crisis, sampling through this year can help to locate the crisis and post-crisis 
impact on disclosure practice. In addition, we did not select a more recent year with the 
objective of testing the impact of the global financial crisis of 2007 which should have been 
reflected in the annual reports around 2009 due to a lag. In addition, only fully-fledged IBs 
with 100% Shari’ah compliant assets were considered for the sample. The Banker: Special 
Issue for Islamic Financial Institutions was utilised as guidance in sampling Islamic banks. If 
an Islamic bank does not provide more than two annual reports between 2007-2014, we exclude 
that Islamic bank from the sample. In the sample selection process, therefore, some major 
Islamic banks are not included in the sample due to lack of available Shari’ah annual reports, 
such as, Alinma Bank, Albilad Bank and Al-Rajhi Bank. Table 3 lists all the sampled Islamic 
banks in this study.  
In calculating the SDI, primary data for disclosure analysis is, hence, gathered from online 
published annual reports of the IBs on their official websites. As for secondary data for 
regression analysis, The Banker Special Issues for Islamic Financial Institutions (2015) and 
Datastream is utilised to obtain control variables for the regression analysis along with annual 
reports of IBs.  
As for the estimation method, in determining the factors affecting disclosure levels of SBs, a 
one-step system of a generalised method of moments (GMM) approach is utilised. One-step 
GMM is selected over two-step GMM due to the small sample size which leads to the problem 
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of over-fitting in a two-step GMM and makes asymptotic standards errors not suitable for 
hypothesis testing (Beck and Levine, 2004). A system GMM approach also resolves the 
endogeneity of regressors while avoiding dynamic panel bias (Uddin et al., 2017). Following 
Mollah and Zaman (2015), we treat bank level control variables as endogenous, while country 
level and macro level variables are exogenous.  
Table 3: Sampled Islamic Banks 
No Country Islamic Bank No Country Islamic Bank 
1 Bahrain Al Baraka Bank 22  Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 
2  Al Salam Bank 23  Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia 
3  Bahrain Islamic Bank 24  Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad 
4  KFH Bahrain 25  Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad 
5  Khaleeji Commercial Bank 26 Pakistan Bank Islami Pakistan 
6  ABC Islamic Bank 27  Burj Bank 
7  Bank al-Khair 28  Meezan Bank Limited 
8 Bangladesh EXIM Bank of Bangladesh 29 Qatar Masraf Al Rayan 
9  
Islami Bank Bangladesh 
Limited 
30  Qatar International Islamic Bank 
10 Egypt Al Baraka Bank Egypt 31  Qatar Islamic Bank 
11 Indonesia Muamalat Indonesia 32 Saudi Arabia Bank Al Jazira 
12  PT Bank Syariah Mandiri 33  Jadwa 
13 Jordan 
Islamic International Arab 
Bank 
34 South Africa Al Baraka South Africa 
14  Jordan Islamic Bank 35 Sudan 
Al Baraka Bank Sudan 
 
15 Kuwait Boubyan Bank 36  Faisal Islamic Bank 
16  KFH 37 UAE Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 
17 Lebanon BLOM Development Bank 38  Emirates Islamic Bank 
18 Malaysia Affin Islamic Bank Berhad 39 UK Al-Rayan Bank 
19  Al-Rajhi Bank Malaysia 40  European Islamic Investment Bank 
20  KFH Malaysia 41  
Bank of London and The Middle 
East 
21  Asian Finance Bank Berhad 
 
5.2. Econometric Specifications for Locating the Factors Determining Disclosure in SARs 
As mentioned above, two disclosure indices are developed and calculated: SDIICG and 
SDIAAOIFI indices. The former is based on the index elements defined in Table 1 representing a 
larger number of items based on the more stringent and substantive moral definition of 
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disclosure, while the latter is defined through AAOIFI standards and composed of items 1-18 
in Table 2.  
In order to determine the factors affecting SDIICG and SDIAAOIFI indices calculated through the 
data generated by disclosure analysis, the following two model specifications are estimated: 
SDIICG,t = α0 + α1 x SDIISGi,t-1 + α2 x Crisis2009i,t+ α3 x NoofMembersi,t 
+α4 x PopularityofMembersi,t+ α5 x AverageEducationi,t + α6 x InternalSADi,t  
+ α7 x AgeofShariahi,t + α8 x IsCountryAAOIFIi,t + α9 x Leveragei,t 
+ α10 x IndependentAuditori,t+ α11 x   LogSizei,t+ α12 x ROAi,t           + α13 x CPIi,t 
+ α14 x GDPGrowthi,t+ α15 x RegularityQualityi,t + α16 x VoiceandAccountabilityi,t  
+ α17 x CEODuality,t + α18 x BoardSize,t + εi,t  
 
SDIAAOIFIi,t = α0 + α1 x SDIAAOIFIi,t-1 + α2 x Crisis2009i,t+ α3 x NoofMembersi,t 
+α4 x PopularityofMembersi,t+ α5 x AverageEducationi,t + α6 x InternalSADi,t  
+ α7 x AgeofShariahi,t + α8 x IsCountryAAOIFIi,t + + α9 x Leveragei,t 
+ α10 x IndependentAuditori,t+ α11 x   LogSizei,t+ α12 x ROAi,t           + α13 x CPIi,t 
+ α14 x GDPGrowthi,t+ α15 x RegularityQualityi,t + α16 x VoiceandAccountabilityi,t  
+ α17 x CEODuality,t + α18 x BoardSize,t + εi,t 
where i denotes individual banks and t denotes the time dimension. While the first equation 
uses 17 explanatory variables to explain the variation in SDIICG, the second equation uses the 
same variables to explain the variation in SDIAAOIFI.  
6. Empirical Analysis 
6.1. Analysis of Disclosure Index Scores 
In the first part of this section, we examine SDIICG and SDIAAOIFI results of sample data. Table 
4 presents the SDIICG scores for each bank between 2007-2014. In terms of average score over 
the eight years, Bahrain Islamic Bank has the highest score with 72%, which is followed by 
Meezan Bank Limited of Pakistan with 63% disclosure score. ABC Islamic and Bank Al-Khair 
are third and fourth in the rank having 62% and 61% score, respectively. As can be seen in 
Table 4, 66% of the sampled IBs achieved a disclosure level between 40-59%. At the bottom 
of the list, a Malaysian bank, Al-Rajhi Malaysia is found to have a 24% score on average as its 
SAR disclosure performance. Relatively high scores of Bahraini IBs might be due to the 
influence of AAOIFI standards which are developed in Bahrain. Furthermore, the relatively 
low scores of Malaysian IBs on average are mostly due to the poor disclosure performance in 
2007 and 2008, which show a gradual increase throughout the sample period. Even, Bank Islam 
Malaysia Berhad disclose the highest level along with Bahrain Islamic Bank in 2014. It is also 
interesting that despite the proximity of Qatar to Bahrain and adoption of AAOIFI governance 
standards at the country level, all three IBs in our sample from Qatar perform very poorly in 
terms of disclosure.  
(2) 
(3) 
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Table 4: SDI for ICG Index for the Sampled Banks 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average 
Bahrain          
ABC Islamic 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 
Al Baraka Bank  0.56 0.53 0.59 - 0.59 0.59 0.59 - 0.57 
Al Salam Bank 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.62 0.62 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 
Bahrain Islamic Bank 0.74 0.77 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.72 
Bank alKhair  0.58 0.61 0.56 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.61 
KFH Bahrain 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.62 0.65 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.56 
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 0.47 0.50 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.52 
Kuwait          
Boubyan Bank 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.41 0.41 0.44 0.53 0.38 
KFH 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.50 0.50 0.62 0.62 0.56 0.47 
Malaysia          
Affin Islamic Bank Berhad  - 0.15 0.38 0.41 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.47 
Al-Rajhi Bank Malaysia 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.44 0.47 0.24 
Asian Finance Bank Berhad 0.15 0.41 0.47 0.56 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.38 0.41 
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 0.15 0.65 0.62 0.65 0.65 0.62 0.62 0.71 0.58 
Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia  - 0.15 - 0.15 0.44 0.56 0.53 0.56 0.40 
Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad  0.15 0.15 - 0.15 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.47 0.32 
Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad  0.41 0.35 0.35 0.35 - 0.41 0.65 0.65 0.45 
KFH Malaysia 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.53 0.53 0.62 0.52 
Pakistan          
Bank Islami Pakistan  0.29 - 0.38 0.44 0.35 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.39 
Burj Bank  0.29 - 0.44 0.58 0.47 0.53 0.56 0.56 0.49 
Meezan Bank Limited 0.59 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.63 
Qatar          
Masraf Al Rayan  - - 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.26 0.26 0.30 
Qatar International Islamic Bank  - - 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.29 0.29 0.39 
Qatar Islamic Bank 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.26 0.26 0.32 
Saudi Arabia          
Bank Al Jazira  - 0.24 0.41 0.53 0.53 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.43 
Jadwa - Investment Bank - 0.44 0.44 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.42 
UAE          
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank  0.29 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.56 
Emirates Islamic Bank 0.47 0.56 0.50 0.56 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 
UK          
BLME 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.42 
EIIB 0.41 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.46 
Islamic Bank of Britain 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.47 0.47 0.53 0.53 0.43 
Bangladesh          
EXIM Bank of Bangladesh 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.42 
Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited 0.50 0.53 0.53 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.51 
Egypt           
Al Baraka Bank Egypt - - 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.41 0.29 
Indonesia          
Muamalat Indonesia 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.29 
PT Bank Syariah Mandiri 0.26 0.26 0.38 0.38 0.41 - 0.41 0.41 0.36 
Jordan          
Islamic International Arab Bank - 0.50 0.53 0.53 0.59 0.59 0.56 0.59 0.55 
Jordan Islamic Bank - 0.53 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.55 
Lebanon          
BLOM Development Bank - 0.59 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.56 0.59 - 0.57 
South Africa          
Al Baraka South Africa 0.59 0.56 0.62 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 
Sudan          
Al Baraka Bank Sudan 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.40 
Faisal Islamic Bank - 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 
Average 0.40 0.44 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.50 
 
Sencal, Harun & Asutay, Mehmet (2021). Ethical Disclosure in the Shari’ah Annual Reports of Islamic Banks: 
Discourse on Shari’ah Governance, Quantitative Empirics and Qualitative Analysis. Corporate Governance. 
25 
 
When we examine the individual SARs of each IB during the sample period, we observe that 
the reports were written shortly without any detailed information. In search of possible 
explanations for such similarity among the three IBs, it is noticed that two Shari’ah scholars 
dominated the SBs of three IBs for most of the sample period, namely, Waleed Bin Hadi and 
Abdul Sattar Abud Ghuddah. Considering the close structures and disclosure levels of SARs 
of each IB, this fact shows how individual scholars might be influential in the preparation of 
SAR and the level of disclosure it involves. 
In terms of temporal analysis, we observe an increase in the average SDIICG score of all sampled 
IBs from a 40% disclosure level in 2007 to 50% in 2014. Furthermore, although SDIICG score 
of an IB does not change substantially between 2007-2014, in some IBs, we notice a substantial 
change in disclosure level. Especially, IBs in Malaysia exhibit sharp increases in their 
disclosure level, such as, Affin Islamic Bank Berhad (from 15%  in 2008 to 38% in 2009), Al-
Rajhi Bank Malaysia (from 21% in 2012 to 44% in 2013), Asian Finance Bank Berhad (from 
15% in 2007 to 41% in 2008), Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (from 15% in 2007 to 65% in 
2008), Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia  and Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad (both from 
15% in 2010 to 44% in 2011), KFH of Kuwait (from 32% in 2009 to 50% in 2010), Abu Dhabi 
Islamic Bank of UAE (from 29% in 2007 to 56% in 2008), Bank Al Jazira of Saudi Arabia 
(from 24% in 2012 to 41% in 2013). On the other hand, in the case of some other IBs no change 
is observed in their SDIICG, such as, ABC Islamic Bank of Bahrain (stable at 62% during the 
sampled period) and Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan (stable at 44% during the sampled period). 
As for the second index, SDIAAOIFI, we observe a considerable increase in score of all sampled 
banks compared to the SDIICG, implying that the sampled IBs are more inclining to fulfil 
AAOIFI expectations, while they are not willing to take the extra measures to better perform 
in line with IME. Table 5 presents the SDIA scores for each bank between 2007-2014. In terms 
of average score over the eight years, ABC Islamic Bank and Bank Al-Khair of Bahrain shares 
the highest score with 94%. BLOM Development Bank of Lebanon follows them with 92%, 
while Bahrain Islamic Bank of Bahrain has a 90% score, which also has the highest score in 
SDIICG. As the results depict, Muamalat Indonesia is at the bottom of the list with a 32% score, 
while Al-Rajhi Bank Malaysia with 37% is the second-worst performer, which also has the 
worst score in SDIICG.  
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Table 5: SDI for AAOIFI Index for the Sampled Banks 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average 
Bahrain          
ABC Islamic 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 
Al Baraka Bank  0.89 0.83 0.89 - 0.89 0.89 0.89 - 0.88 
Al Salam Bank 0.56 0.56 0.61 0.72 0.72 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.65 
Bahrain Islamic Bank 0.94 0.94 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.90 
Bank alKhair  0.94 0.94 0.89 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 
KFH Bahrain 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.89 0.94 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.81 
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 0.67 0.67 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.71 
Kuwait          
Boubyan Bank 0.33 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.56 0.56 0.61 0.78 0.50 
KFH 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.67 0.67 0.72 0.72 0.67 0.56 
Malaysia          
Affin Islamic Bank Berhad  - 0.28 0.72 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.70 
Al-Rajhi Bank Malaysia 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.28 0.78 0.78 0.37 
Asian Finance Bank Berhad 0.22 0.67 0.78 0.89 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.68 
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 0.28 0.83 0.83 0.89 0.89 0.83 0.83 0.89 0.78 
Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia  - 0.28 - 0.28 0.72 0.83 0.83 0.89 0.64 
Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad  0.28 0.28 - 0.28 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.60 
Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad  0.67 0.61 0.61 0.61 - 0.67 0.89 0.89 0.71 
KFH Malaysia 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.78 0.78 0.83 0.83 0.94 0.83 
Pakistan          
Bank Islami Pakistan  0.28 - 0.33 0.39 0.39 0.44 0.44 0.39 0.38 
Burj Bank  0.33 - 0.44 0.67 0.56 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.57 
Meezan Bank Limited 0.56 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.63 
Qatar          
Masraf Al Rayan  - - 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.33 0.33 0.41 
Qatar International Islamic Bank  - - 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.33 0.33 0.52 
Qatar Islamic Bank 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.39 0.39 0.47 
Saudi Arabia          
Bank Al Jazira  - 0.33 0.67 0.78 0.78 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.65 
Jadwa - Investment Bank - 0.67 0.67 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.63 
UAE          
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank  0.44 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.86 
Emirates Islamic Bank 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.73 
UK          
BLME 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.65 
EIIB 0.67 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 
Islamic Bank of Britain 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.50 0.72 0.72 0.78 0.78 0.63 
Bangladesh          
EXIM Bank of Bangladesh 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.53 
Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited 0.61 0.67 0.67 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.63 
Egypt          
Al Baraka Bank Egypt - - 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.56 0.78 0.56 
Indonesia          
Muamalat Indonesia 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.32 
PT Bank Syariah Mandiri 0.33 0.33 0.44 0.50 0.50 - 0.50 0.50 0.44 
Jordan          
Islamic International Arab Bank - 0.61 0.72 0.72 0.78 0.78 0.72 0.78 0.73 
Jordan Islamic Bank - 0.83 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88 
Lebanon          
BLOM Development Bank - 0.94 0.89 0.89 0.94 0.89 0.94 - 0.92 
South Africa          
Al Baraka South Africa 0.83 0.83 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88 
Sudan          
Al Baraka Bank Sudan 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.61 0.58 
Faisal Islamic Bank - 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Average 0.55 0.61 0.64 0.65 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.71  
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The overall performance over the sample period demonstrates an increase in average SDIAAOIFI 
scores from 55% in 2007 to 71% in 2014. Hence, we can argue that although there is a general 
increase in disclosure level of SBs, compliance with AAOIFI guidelines is progressed better 
throughout the years as compared to the results with SDIICG.  
As can be seen from the results for average SDIICG scores at country level in Table 6, the 
Bahraini Islamic banking sample has the highest score with 60%, while an Egyptian Islamic 
banking sample has the lowest score with 29%. Considering that the only sample from Egypt 
is Al-Baraka Egypt, which is a foreign subsidiary of a Bahraini bank, namely Al-Baraka, this 
shows the impact of local factors on SDI, as the Egyptian subsidiary has a considerably lower 
score despite being a part of the same group. Although, Al-Baraka Egypt scores very poorly in 
terms of SDIICG, they provide a one-page long SAR. However, throughout the sample period, 
they did not disclose any information beyond AAOIFI guidelines for SAR. Even though they 
follow the template prepared by AAOIFI for SAR to a certain extent, they do not disclose every 
item in that template either. Some of the items they do not disclose are technical items, such 
as, ‘Report signed by all members’ or ‘Date the report as of the completion date of the review 
is disclosed’. However, they also skip some of the important parts of the template as well, such 
as, ‘Treatment of all earnings realized from sources prohibited by Shari’ah is disposed to 
charitable causes’, ‘The role and responsibilities of the board are disclosed’ or ‘Report has 
identified the management's responsibility’ which are disclosed in SAR of Al-Baraka of 
Bahrain. As a summary, the Islamic banking sample in 11 out of 15 countries scored within 40-
59% range, which shows that index scores are relatively close to each other. 
When we calculated the average SDIICG score of the banks over the years in total, we clearly 
observed an increase in SDIICG score throughout eight years. However, when the average is 
calculated for each country instead of total average, this pattern is lost. Although the average 
score of all banks throughout the sampled years suggest a pattern of increasing disclosure in 
SARs in terms of SDIICG score, we cannot claim a similar pattern at the country level. Kuwait, 
the UK and Egypt are the only exceptions at country level which exhibit an increasing SDI 
score over the years. Nevertheless, we can argue that most of the countries have a higher score 
in 2014 compared to 2007 on average with the exceptions of Qatar and Bangladesh.  
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Table 6: SDIICG of SDIAAOIFI by Country Level 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average 
 ICG AAOIFI ICG AAOIFI ICG AAOIFI ICG AAOIFI ICG AAOIFI ICG AAOIFI ICG AAOIFI ICG AAOIFI ICG AAOIFI 
Bahrain 0.56 0.80 0.57 0.79 0.57 0.80 0.62 0.85 0.62 0.87 0.61 0.85 0.61 0.85 0.61 0.84 0.60 0.83 
Kuwait 0.31 0.34 0.32 0.37 0.32 0.37 0.41 0.53 0.46 0.61 0.51 0.64 0.53 0.67 0.54 0.72 0.43 0.53 
Malaysia 0.25 0.42 0.31 0.50 0.42 0.67 0.36 0.59 0.46 0.71 0.47 0.72 0.53 0.81 0.56 0.84 0.42 0.66 
Pakistan 0.39 0.39 0.62 0.61 0.48 0.46 0.54 0.56 0.48 0.52 0.53 0.59 0.54 0.59 0.54 0.57 0.52 0.54 
Qatar 0.35 0.50 0.35 0.50 0.37 0.52 0.37 0.52 0.36 0.52 0.36 0.52 0.27 0.35 0.27 0.35 0.34 0.47 
Saudi Arabia - - 0.34 0.50 0.43 0.67 0.47 0.69 0.47 0.69 0.43 0.64 0.43 0.64 0.43 0.64 0.43 0.64 
UAE 0.38 0.56 0.56 0.78 0.53 0.78 0.56 0.78 0.57 0.81 0.57 0.89 0.57 0.89 0.57 0.89 0.54 0.80 
UK 0.39 0.60 0.41 0.62 0.41 0.62 0.41 0.62 0.45 0.70 0.46 0.70 0.47 0.72 0.47 0.72 0.43 0.66 
Bangladesh 0.47 0.58 0.49 0.61 0.49 0.61 0.47 0.58 0.47 0.58 0.44 0.56 0.44 0.56 0.44 0.56 0.46 0.58 
Egypt - - - - 0.26 0.50 0.26 0.50 0.26 0.50 0.26 0.50 0.29 0.56 0.41 0.78 0.29 0.56 
Indonesia 0.26 0.31 0.26 0.31 0.32 0.36 0.32 0.39 0.34 0.39 0.32 0.39 0.37 0.44 0.37 0.44 0.32 0.38 
Jordan - - 0.51 0.72 0.54 0.81 0.54 0.81 0.57 0.83 0.57 0.83 0.56 0.81 0.57 0.83 0.55 0.81 
Lebanon - - 0.59 0.94 0.53 0.89 0.56 0.89 0.59 0.94 0.56 0.89 0.59 0.94 - - 0.57 0.92 
South Africa 0.59 0.83 0.56 0.83 0.62 0.89 0.59 0.89 0.59 0.89 0.59 0.89 0.59 0.89 0.59 0.89 0.59 0.88 
Sudan 0.41 0.61 0.43 0.56 0.43 0.56 0.41 0.53 0.41 0.53 0.41 0.53 0.41 0.53 0.43 0.56 0.42 0.55 
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When we examine SARs of IBs in Qatar closely, we observe a change in the template of the 
reports in three IBs in 2013 and 2014 which decreased the number of required disclosed items, 
as in 2014, items 5-8 from AAOIFI standards as listed in Table 1 were removed resulting into 
lesser disclosure. This result could be attributed to the change in the composition of SB or the 
change in the behaviours of Shari’ ah scholars. However, we observe that the only substantial 
change in SB composition is the addition of Shari’ah scholar, Ahmad Ahmin, in 2012 to Masraf 
Al Rayan and Qatar International Islamic Bank, and in 2013, to Qatar International Bank; while 
Shari’ah scholars Waleed Bin Hadi and Abdul Sattar Abud Ghuddah were the permanent 
members of all three SBs in Qatar between 2010 and 2014. Such a change in the template 
which decreases the level of disclosure without a substantial transformation in SB bring along 
questions about the impact of Shari’ah scholars on the preparation of SARs.  
As for Bangladesh, the cause of the decrease in the level of disclosure is more surprising. 
Although Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited exhibited a stable performance in SAR disclosure 
throughout the sampled period, in the case of EXIM Bank Bangladesh, the level of disclosure 
decreased between 2012 and 2014, which is due to the non-disclosure of items 2 and 31. 
Although item 31, namely, disclosure of a number of meetings is an important detail, item 2 
appears as a trivial detail, which is the report being addressed appropriately. These structural 
changes without necessarily providing a refinement for reporting suggests the existence of 
bank-level factors beyond SB, such as, internal Shari’ah auditing departments, as it is shown 
in panel data analysis in the next section. Such a bank-level impact might also explain the 
fluctuations between 2007 and 2014 in most of the sampled countries, as many of these states 
could not achieve gradual progress. 
The average SDIAAOIFI scores for the sampled banks were drawn are also displayed in Table 6. 
As can be seen from the results, based on average scores, Lebanon is the top scoring country 
with a 92% of disclosure score, while South Africa is the second, with 88% of the AAOIFI 
required items being disclosed in the SARs. Although Bahrain has two IBs with highest 
SDIAAOIFI scores in our sample, namely, ABC Islamic and Bank Al-Khair, at the country level, 
it achieved the highest third SDIAAOIFI score with 83% on average. One of the important reasons 
for such an outcome is the difference in the sample size for each country. While Bahrain is 
represented by seven IBs, Lebanon and South Africa are represented with only one IB each. 
Therefore, although Bahrain has two highest scoring IBs in SDI, due to the other IBs in the 
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sample, its average score declined by bringing the country level average to third place. 
Indonesia is located at the bottom of the list with a 38% score. Overall, unlike SDIICG, SDIAAOIFI 
score of countries is dispersed between 38% and 92% without clustering within a small range.  
In the findings, AAOIFI membership, national culture of the respective country, the presence 
of a national Shari’ah board as well as the willingness of the authorities to develop Islamic 
finance has been important alongside the political regimes of the countries. It seems that the 
countries which have provided level playing field for IBs through state incentives, such as 
Malaysia, has demonstrated a reasonable performance, while Qatar and Saudi Arabia has 
managed to follow Malaysia’s success. Thus, summary data in Table 6 presents an opportunity 
to compare the performance of the sampled countries. However, attempting to correlate the 
SAR disclosure performance with the presence of a National Shari’ah Boars does not present 
a meaningful result. 
To further investigate the characteristics of country-level SDI scores, Table 7 and Table 8 
presents descriptive statistics for SDIICG and SDIAAOIFI, respectively. In terms of mean value, 
all countries lay in the range of 40-59% score levels, except Qatar (34%) and Egypt (29%). 
Bahrain and South Africa have the highest mean values with 59%, while Egypt has the lowest 
mean value at 29%, almost half of the highest mean value.  
In further analysing the data, as can be seen in Table 7, the Malaysian sample has the highest 
standard deviations with 0.17. Although Malaysia has the highest number of observations (59 
out of 305) which might also play a role in such dispersion, based on Table 6, we can argue 
that an increase in SDIICG throughout the sampled period and sharp jumps in SDIICG scores of 
individual banks in different years play the most important role in the observed high standard 
deviation. On the other hand, Pakistan which is represented by three IBs in this study owes its 
relatively high standard deviation score mostly to the heterogeneity of sampled IBs among 
themselves rather than progress in the time period of eight years. Although Bahrain has the 
second highest number of observations (54 out of 305), with a 0.07 standard deviation, it 
exhibits uniformity in disclosure practices within IBs in Bahrain and throughout the sampled 
period, which is also evident from the results displayed in Tables 4 and 6. As can be seen, the 
lowest standard deviation belongs to Lebanon and South Africa (0.02) which are represented 
in this study by only one IB each. However, while Egypt is also represented by one IB, it has a 
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standard deviation of 0.06 which shows that the number of IBs is not the only explanation for 
standard deviation as the Bahraini case proves.  
Excess kurtosis statistic shows the peak of the data where a normally distributed data should 
have a kurtosis of 0. As depicted in Table 7, higher values suggest heavier tails for the 
distribution compared to normal distribution, such as, the case of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt 
and South Africa, while the lower values suggest lighter tails, such as, the case for Indonesia, 
Sudan, Kuwait and Pakistan. Although the rest of the countries do not have exactly a kurtosis 
of 0, they are relatively close to 0.  
As an indicator for the symmetry of the distribution, if the data is symmetric, the value of 
skewness should be close to 0, while the degree of skewness increases as it gets further away 
from 0. While a negative value for skewness suggests the data is skewed to the left, a positive 
value suggest the opposite. According to Table 7, Egypt is the only country with a strong right-
skewed distribution, while Qatar, with a less than half value of skewness, also displays a similar 
picture. As the results depict, the countries with strong negative skewness are UAE and Saudi 
Arabia. Although most of the countries are skewed to the left (9 out of 15), the value of 
skewness of these countries is not far away from 0. 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics by Countries for ICG Index  
Mean Std Dev. Kurt Skew Range Min Max Observation 
Bahrain 0.59 0.07 0.14 0.16 0.33 0.44 0.77 54 
Kuwait 0.43 0.11 -1.25 0.48 0.32 0.29 0.62 16 
Malaysia 0.43 0.17 -0.95 -0.51 0.56 0.15 0.71 59 
Pakistan 0.51 0.12 -1.19 -0.40 0.35 0.29 0.65 22 
Qatar 0.34 0.06 -0.49 0.68 0.18 0.26 0.44 20 
Saudi Arabia 0.43 0.07 5.09 -1.37 0.29 0.24 0.53 14 
UAE 0.54 0.08 6.23 -2.10 0.32 0.29 0.62 16 
UK 0.44 0.05 -0.29 -0.21 0.18 0.35 0.53 24 
Bangladesh 0.46 0.05 -1.06 -0.44 0.15 0.38 0.53 16 
Egypt 0.29 0.06 5.12 2.25 0.15 0.26 0.41 6 
Indonesia 0.32 0.06 -1.60 0.46 0.15 0.26 0.41 15 
Jordan 0.55 0.03 0.24 -0.53 0.09 0.50 0.59 14 
Lebanon 0.57 0.02 -0.30 -0.86 0.06 0.53 0.59 6 
South Africa 0.59 0.02 3.50 0.00 0.06 0.56 0.62 8 
Sudan 0.42 0.03 -1.55 -0.43 0.06 0.38 0.44 15 
Total 0.47 0.13 -0.16 -0.49 0.63 0.15 0.77 305 
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In further examining the descriptive statistics for SDIICG, the scores in Table 7 depict that 
Malaysia has the highest range with 0.56, which is followed by Pakistan with 0.35. The lowest 
ranges also belong to Lebanon and South Africa. 
Table 8 presents descriptive statistics for SDIA. In terms of mean value, countries are dispersed 
within a long range of mean values, namely 38-92% score range, while 9 out of 15 countries 
are clustered between 53-66% score range. Lebanon has the highest mean value with 92% 
disclosure score, while Indonesia has the lowest mean value with 38%. As the results show, 
South Africa, Bahrain, Jordan and UAE achieve a higher SDIA score by exceeding 80%. In 
terms of standard deviation, Malaysia has the highest value with 0.24, being followed by 
Kuwait (0.16) and UAE (0.15). The lowest standard deviation scores for SDIA observed in the 
case of Lebanon and South Africa (0.03), as it is also the case for SDIICG.  
Unlike SDIICG, as descriptive statistics for SDIAAOIFI show, the only countries with higher 
excess kurtosis values are Saudi Arabia and Egypt, while Indonesia, Sudan, Kuwait, Lebanon 
and Pakistan all have excess kurtosis values lower than a normal distribution. However, South 
Africa, which has a high positive excess kurtosis for SDIICG, has exactly an excess kurtosis of 
0 in the case of SDIAAOIFI, while other countries are relatively close to 0.  
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics by Countries for AAOIFI Index  
Mean Std Dev. Kurt Skew Range Min Max Observation 
Bahrain 0.83 0.12 -0.92 -0.74 0.39 0.56 0.94 54 
Kuwait 0.53 0.16 -1.78 0.06 0.44 0.33 0.78 16 
Malaysia 0.66 0.24 -0.67 -1.00 0.72 0.22 0.94 59 
Pakistan 0.53 0.13 -1.36 -0.47 0.39 0.28 0.67 22 
Qatar 0.47 0.10 -0.92 0.12 0.28 0.33 0.61 20 
Saudi Arabia 0.64 0.10 6.09 -1.85 0.44 0.33 0.78 14 
UAE 0.80 0.15 0.25 -0.90 0.50 0.44 0.94 16 
UK 0.66 0.08 0.14 -0.97 0.28 0.50 0.78 24 
Bangladesh 0.58 0.05 -0.76 -0.05 0.17 0.50 0.67 16 
Egypt 0.56 0.11 5.13 2.25 0.28 0.50 0.78 6 
Indonesia 0.38 0.09 -1.59 0.26 0.22 0.28 0.50 15 
Jordan 0.81 0.09 -0.23 -0.72 0.28 0.61 0.89 14 
Lebanon 0.92 0.03 -3.33 0.00 0.06 0.89 0.94 6 
South Africa 0.88 0.03 0.00 -1.44 0.06 0.83 0.89 8 
Sudan 0.54 0.05 -1.55 0.43 0.11 0.50 0.61 15 
Total 0.66 0.20 -0.74 -0.39 0.72 0.22 0.94 305 
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According to the results of SDIAAOIFI as depicted in Table 8, Egypt is the only country with a 
strong right-skewed distribution, as it is also the case with SDIICG, while Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa and Malaysia have strong negative skewness. Although most of the countries are skewed 
to the left (9 out of 15), the value of skewness of these countries is not far away from 0. 
As the comparative results from Table 7 and 9 show, range values for SDIAAOIFI is similar to 
SDIICG. While Malaysia has the highest difference between the minimum and maximum values, 
Lebanon and South Africa have the lowest range. However, the range of disclosure scores of 
UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are relatively high for SDIAAOIFI as compared to SDIICG. This 
suggests that some IBs in these countries achieved a higher compliance with AAOIFI standards 
for SARs in terms of the level of disclosure during the sample period compared to the general 
index of this study, while Malaysia, Lebanon and South Africa follows a stable pattern in both 
SDIICG and SDIAAOIFI. 
Table 9 displays the annual mean disclosure scores of all sampled IBs for individual items as 
part of SDI. In order to develop a better snapshot, results depicted in Table 9 are classified as 
scores between 0.71-1.00, 0.50-0.70, and scores less than 0.50. These are highlighted in Table 
10. 
In general, we observe an increase in item or dimension score from 2007 to 2014, which 
suggests a refinement in each year. Furthermore, the disclosure level of items determined by 
AAOIFI standards is considerably greater than custom items. This difference is especially 
evident for the items 22-34. However, because index items 19-21 are a subset of index item 17, 
we can claim that all index items which are not derived from AAOIFI standards for SAR are 
disclosed considerably low in sampled IBs in this study. This suggests that AAOIFI guidelines 
for SARs have an impact on the preparation of the reports, even for the IBs which did not 
officially adopt AAOIFI standards. This further suggests that the majority of SBs do not prefer 
to disclose detailed information regarding their activities and monitoring processes.  
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Table 9: SDI by Individual Items 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
1 Report has an appropriate title 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2 Report has been appropriately addressed 0.47 0.47 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.56 0.54 
3 Report has identified the purpose of the engagement (opening paragraph) 0.37 0.53 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.55 0.56 0.62 
4 Report has identified the nature of the work performed (scope paragraph) 0.60 0.64 0.79 0.78 0.83 0.80 0.78 0.79 
5 Report has identified the management's responsibility 0.53 0.56 0.67 0.65 0.75 0.80 0.73 0.77 
6 Independent judgment in carrying out its responsibilities is disclosed. 0.43 0.47 0.54 0.53 0.63 0.68 0.66 0.69 
7 The role and responsibilities of the board are disclosed. 0.50 0.56 0.64 0.63 0.70 0.80 0.73 0.77 
8 Confirmation that the SB has performed appropriate tests, procedures and review work as appropriate 0.37 0.47 0.54 0.58 0.68 0.68 0.73 0.72 
9 Confirmation that the transaction and dealings are in compliance with Shari'ah rules and principles  0.47 0.61 0.64 0.63 0.70 0.70 0.76 0.74 
10 Treatment of all earnings realized from sources prohibited by Shari’ah is disposed to charitable causes 0.50 0.50 0.59 0.58 0.65 0.63 0.68 0.67 
11 Compliance of zakat calculation with Shari’ah is disclosed. -opinion 0.47 0.56 0.56 0.53 0.60 0.63 0.61 0.62 
12 Statement on the endorsed conformity of Shari’ah compliance is disclosed 0.90 0.97 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 
13 Distribution of profits and losses comply with Shari’ah is disclosed. 0.37 0.44 0.54 0.58 0.65 0.68 0.71 0.69 
14 Report on the violations of Shari’ah compliance (if any) is disclosed. 0.40 0.36 0.31 0.35 0.30 0.33 0.34 0.36 
15 Period covered is disclosed 0.90 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 
16 Date the report as of the completion date of the review is disclosed 0.47 0.53 0.51 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.49 0.46 
17 Report signed by all members.  0.30 0.42 0.38 0.48 0.53 0.53 0.56 0.54 
18 The report is published in the annual report 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
19 Report signed by chairman 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.75 0.75 0.73 0.74 
20 Names of members are disclosed. 0.50 0.61 0.62 0.65 0.63 0.65 0.66 0.64 
21 Name of the chairman is disclosed 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.83 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.85 
22 Pictures of members are disclosed 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.15 0.15 
23 Examination of product development ex ante is provided. 0.13 0.14 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.18 0.20 0.21 
24 Examination of product development ex post is provided. 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 
25 Holding meetings during the year is disclosed. 0.13 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.24 0.26 
26 The training information of the employees is disclosed. 0.23 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.18 
27 The Shari’ah auditing department in the bank is disclosed. 0.37 0.42 0.49 0.48 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.51 
28 SB adopted one of the standards as guidelines (AAOIFI or IFSB). 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 
29 Report discloses that the management supplies complete, accurate and adequate information in a timely manner 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.08 
30 Holding meeting with BOD 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.08 
31 Number of meetings during the year is disclosed. 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.18 
32 Details of the training information of the employees is disclosed. 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.10 
33 Details of the violations of Shari’ah compliance (if any) is disclosed. 0.20 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.17 0.15 
34 Details of treatment of all earnings realized from sources prohibited is disposed to charitable causes is disclosed 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.15 
 Average 0.40 0.44 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.50 
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Index items, or dimensions 1 and 18 have a perfect full score in each year of the sampled period 
which is included in both SDIAAOIFI and SDIICG. However, since the annual report of IBs was 
the only tool to obtain SARs of these IBs, this item is tautological and does not provide 
information, which is included only due to being part of AAOIFI guidelines. The third highest 
score belongs to item 12 which is a ‘Statement on the endorsed conformity of Shari’ah 
compliance is disclosed’. This item actually is the core of the SAR, since it legitimises the IBs’ 
activities on the sight of customers; therefore, even the shortest SARs (e.g. 3-4 sentences long) 
document this item. However, it is important to note that this item only checks the consent of 
a SB without looking for any justification for such consent or expecting an explanation of the 
methodology of how a SB is convinced of such compliance.  
Similar to the report title, another technical detail is the period covered by the report which 
also has a high disclosure level throughout the years. Similarly, a high disclosure score is found 
with item 21, which is the disclosure of the name of the chairman. However, when it comes to 
disclosure of names of all members of a SB (item 20) or signatures of the chairman and 
members (item 19 and 17), the disclosure level decreases for all the sampled years.  
Item 14, which is ‘Report on the violations of Shari’ah compliance (if any) is disclosed’, stays 
within relatively low levels of disclosure compared to the other AAOIFI standards required 
items, 1-18. For this item, we checked whether there is any disclosure for the violations even 
if the income generated from such a transaction is disposed to charitable causes. Although, 
most of the banks disclose the fact that they disposed of impure income to charitable causes, 
they do not disclose the existence of a violation of Shari’ah in the report. We believe, in terms 
of rhetoric, this is an important distinction. Furthermore, for those who disclose the violation 
of Shari’ah in relation to this particular item, the nature of the violation is mostly omitted and 
contented within the disclosure of violation only.  
Another point to note is the progress over time. It is evident that in general, there is a refinement 
in the reports from one year to the other in relation to the AAOIFI items. However, we cannot 
observe such a positive change in non-AAOIFI items with some exceptions such as item 19 
and 27. Considering that the latter items indicate pro-activity beyond voluntary disclosure and 
transparency, it seems that IBs are not necessarily prepared to act in a pro-active manner in 
disclosing the expected items in their SARs. 
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6.2. Analysis of Qualitative Data from SARs 
Although statistical findings help us to reflect on the degree Shari’ah scholars pay attention to 
the substantive morality articulated by IME, qualitative analysis of the published SARs through 
textual analysis reveals further details which cannot be detected in the statistical analysis. In 
this section, therefore, we focus on the content of SARs to show how Shari’ah scholars might 
be contented with approval of Shari’ah compliance without substantiating it through any 
disclosure, and the concerns and the warnings of Shari’ah scholars raised in SARs are being 
ignored by the top-level management, which evidences the lost legitimacy and lost negotiating 
power of Shari’ah scholars and the hegemony of the market system in shaping their decision-
making process. 
The SAR published by the Shari’ah board of Affin Islamic Bank of Malaysia in 2008, for 
example, shows how a Shari’ah committee expects stakeholders to have trust in their 
judgement without disclosing any details of how the operations in Affin Islamic Bank were 
conducted. The following paragraph was the content of the whole SAR in 2008: 
We, Dr. Hailani Muji Tahir and Dr. Md. Khalil Ruslan, two of the members of the Shariah 
Committee of AFFIN Islamic Bank Berhad, do hereby confirm on behalf of the Shariah 
Committee, that in our opinion, the operation of the Bank for the financial year ended 31 
December 2008 have been conducted in conformity with the Shariah principles.  
Although Malaysian Islamic banks have increased the level of information disclosed after 2008 
as evidenced in this empirical research, such a short report of Affin Islamic Bank was not an 
exception in Malaysia during 2007 and 2008. Such reports imply that the trust accorded to 
Shari’ah scholars’ supervision of IBs does not stem, in most of the cases, from substantiated 
knowledge communicated through SARs or other channels but is directly reliant on the 
existence of a SB and the esteem attached to their approval of the operations. Thus, Shari’ah 
scholars have been using their position to impose themselves on the stakeholders via claiming 
Shari’ah hegemony, while working towards enhancing the shareholders’ interests under the 
hegemony of a market mechanism. In other words, they work within the institutional logics of 
the market system as represented by IBs and expect stakeholders to have trust in the outcomes 
and process of IBs as part of the market system, by definition, due to being designated as a 
Shari’ah scholar. 
In terms of the influence of Shari’ah scholars in affecting the everyday operations of IBs, the 
content of SARs of Bank Al-Khair from Bahrain evidences the lack of power of Shari’ah 
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scholars, at least for some IBs. It is not common to observe Shari’ah scholars issuing public 
warnings to management in terms of a lack of Shari’ah compliance, such as, through SARs. 
However, the SB of Bank Al-Khair disclosed the lack of Shari’ah compliance within, the Taj 
Mall project, which was cited in their 2010 SAR. However, details referred to within 
subsequent years’ SARs suggests that the management did not exit from the project as soon as 
possible, while the bank increased its involvement in other non-Shari’ah compliant projects 
(such as: Open-Silicon and Logistics & Warehousing) along with the continued Taj Mall 
project. This was mainly because they did not submit the projects for the approval by the SB 
in advance, as non-Shari’ah compliance issues later revealed by the SB. Below is  an excerpt 
of the related section from the SARs of Bank Al-Khair between 2010-2014 (the emphasis in 
the quotations are added): 
2010: The contracts, transactions and dealings entered into by the Group during the year ended 
31 December 2010 are in compliance with the rules and principles of Islamic Shari’ah, except 
the investment in Taj Mall project which the Shari’ah Board advised in a previous resolution 
to exit as soon as possible. 
2011: The contracts, transactions and dealings entered into by the Group during the year ended 
31 December 2011 are in compliance with the rules and principles of Islamic Shari’ah, except 
the investment in Taj Mall project which the Shari’ah Board advised in a previous resolution 
to exit as soon as possible. 
2012: The contracts, transactions and dealings entered into by the Group during the year ended 
31 December 2012 are in compliance with the rules and principles of Islamic Shari’ah, except 
for the investment in Taj Mall which the Shari’ah Board advised in a previous resolution to 
exit as soon as possible. 
2013: The contracts, transactions and dealings entered into by the Group during the year ended 
31 December 2013 are in compliance with the rules and principles of Islamic Shari’ah except 
part of the investment in Taj Mall project, Open Silicon and The Independent For Logistics 
& Warehousing which were not submitted to the Shari’ah Board for approval before its 
execution, and appear later to be having explicitly non-Shari’ah Compliance issues. 
2014: The contracts, transactions and dealings entered into by the Group during the year ended 
31 December 2014 are in compliance with the rules and principles of Shari’ah except part of 
the investment in Taj Mall project, Open Silicon and Logistics & Warehousing which were 
not submitted to the Shari’ah Board for approval before its execution, and appear later to be 
having explicitly non-Shari’ah Compliance issues. 
As clarified by the above excerpts and examples, top-level strata of management do not always 
act in line with the advice of a SB. Considering that  non-Shari’ah compliant projects have 
increased in later years, this attitude is not due to the constraints of one particular project, but 
outlines the management’s approach towards the SB in general, namely, they impose market 
restraints on the Shari’ah scholars and expect Shari’ah legitimacy to be granted in return for a 
place on their SB. As discussed in the following chapters, where Shari’ah scholars’ legitimacy 
is drawn from their affiliation with a particular SB, they do not possess negotiation powers 
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beyond issuing advice. Since the top-management at IBs are aware of the attractiveness of SB 
posts amongst Shari’ah scholars, fatwa shopping, fatwa re-positioning (Ullah et al., 2018), and 
Shari’ah arbitrage (El-Gamal, 2007) facilitates the process by imposing market requirements 
and institutional logics of the bank on the Shari’ah scholars, as conditions. 
In summary: these qualitative analyses show the role and status of Shari’ah scholars in modern 
IBs. In other words, the mere existence and approval of IB instruments and transactions by a 
SB without substantive evidence can sustain the ‘Islamic’ identity of an IB, while their role of 
supervision does not significantly impact upon everyday practices of an IB, at least within some 
IBs. 
6.3. Determinants of Disclosure Performance: Econometrics Analysis 
After presenting and discussing the statistical findings in relation to the disclosure scores and 
the qualitative analysis, this section focuses on the findings in relation to a system-GMM 
analysis by using SDIICG index and SDIAAOIFI index as dependent variables. 
The pairwise correlation matrix of independent variables, as depicted in Table 10, suggest, in 
general, a low correlation among the pair of variables and there is no perfect multicollinearity 
among them. Tables 11 and 12 present the System GMM test results for SDIICG and SDIA, 
respectively, where we consider SDIICG and SDIAAOIFI as dependent variables, respectively.  
As depicted in tables 11 and 12, the number of observations is decreased to 179 from 305 in 
both models. This decrease is related to the internal process of system-GMM calculations 
which uses lagged values of variables and therefore decreases the number of observations 
utilised. As for the independent variables, the popularity of Shari’ah scholars is significant in 
both models. The popularity of Shari’ah scholars is significant at a 10% significance level in 
both models. The significance of popularity of Shari’ah scholars in both models suggests that 
sitting on multiple chairs positively influences the preparation of Shari’ah annual reports. This 
result suggests that if a SB is composed of Shari’ah scholars who have positions in multiple 
boards, level of disclosure in SAR increases, especially, in terms of providing details.  
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Table 10: Pairwise Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 

























No of Members 1.00                 
Leverage 0.05 1.00                
Ind. Auditor 0.04 0.04 1.00               
Internal SAD 0.15 0.25 -0.24 1.00              
Size 0.36 0.41 -0.13 0.25 1.00             
ROA 0.04 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.29 1.00            
AgeOfShariah -0.02 0.27 0.00 0.17 0.22 0.24 1.00           
CPI -0.04 -0.39 -0.29 0.05 0.10 -0.17 -0.21 1.00          
GDPGrowth 0.15 0.09 0.00 0.12 0.30 0.32 0.11 0.09 1.00         
RegQuality 0.03 -0.40 -0.36 0.06 0.00 -0.26 -0.33 0.89 0.01 1.00        
VandA -0.19 -0.30 -0.06 -0.36 -0.33 -0.29 -0.27 0.56 -0.28 0.57 1.00       
IsCountryAAOIFI -0.14 -0.10 -0.08 0.23 -0.05 0.20 0.42 -0.03 0.23 -0.11 -0.51 1.00      
PopularitySB -0.02 -0.39 -0.40 0.16 -0.17 -0.22 -0.22 0.35 -0.17 0.32 0.16 0.06 1.00     
CrisisDummy 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.20 0.25 -0.10 0.17 -0.02 -0.19 -0.01 -0.08 0.05 0.00 1.00    
Av. Education -0.07 -0.19 -0.02 -0.10 0.08 -0.09 -0.05 0.08 -0.02 0.01 -0.16 0.24 0.07 0.09 1.00   
Board Size 0.24 -0.12 -0.07 0.14 0.00 0.10 0.27 -0.08 0.03 -0.11 -0.20 0.28 0.22 0.01 -0.23 1.00  
CEO Duality 0.23 -0.10 0.16 0.11 -0.21 -0.13 0.01 -0.04 -0.27 0.08 0.01 -0.14 0.16 -0.09 -0.16 0.11 1.00 
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Table 11: System GMM Test Results for SDIICG 
Variable  Coefficient  Robust Std. error t P>|t| 
SDIGeneral (Lag1) 0.285 0.168 1.700 0.100 
RegularityQuality 0.003 0.002 1.610 0.118 
VoiceandAccountability 0.000 0.002 -0.150 0.883 
CPI -0.040 0.032 -1.240 0.224 
IsCountryAAOIFI -0.099 0.093 -1.060 0.296 
GDPGrowth -0.020 0.236 -0.080 0.934 
CEODuality -0.076 0.133 -0.570 0.572 
LogSize -0.029 0.044 -0.660 0.515 
Leverage -0.058 0.161 -0.360 0.720 
ROA -0.452 0.398 -1.130 0.265 
IndependentAuditor 0.026 0.026 0.990 0.330 
InternalSAD** 0.216 0.098 2.200 0.035 
CrisisDummy -0.009 0.020 -0.450 0.653 
AgeofShariah 0.004 0.003 1.400 0.171 
NoofMembers -0.005 0.025 -0.180 0.855 
AverageEducation 0.072 0.048 1.500 0.143 
Popularity*** 0.070 0.036 1.960 0.058 
BoardSize 0.016 0.016 1.050 0.304 
Constant 0.036 0.381 0.100 0.924 
     
No of Obs. 179    
No of Groups 33    
No of Instruments 28    
     
AR(1) 0.048    
AR(2) 0.380    
Hansen Test (p-val)**** 0.276    
Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; **** Since robust standard errors were utilised, we only report Hansen test result.  
 
This might be due to the exposure to different reporting and disclosure styles on different 
boards. In other words, there might be a knowledge transfer from one institution to another 
where a Shari’ah scholar has a chair in both. Another explanation for the significance of this 
variable might be due to the prestigious status of these Shari’ah scholars who, in line with their 
reputation and experience, wants to issue quality reports with high disclosure levels. This 
finding is also consistent with the finding of El-Halaby and Hussainey (2016) who argued that 
exposure of reputable Shari’ah scholars to modern banking and disclosure structures might 
help to produce a higher level of disclosure. Considering that the measure of popularity in this 
study is occupying a high number of chairs in multiple IFIs, in terms of policy making, 
placement of Shari’ah scholars in multiple chairs might be promoted to increase the level of 
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disclosure. Furthermore, both coefficients for the popularity of Shari’ah scholars are close to 
each other (0.070 for General index and 0.094 for AAOIFI index). 
Table 12: System GMM Test Results for SDIAAOIFI 
Variable  Coefficient  Robust Std. error t P>|t| 
SDIAAOIFI (Lag1)** 0.416 0.187 2.220 0.034 
RegularityQuality** 0.007 0.003 2.490 0.018 
VoiceandAccountability -0.005 0.003 -1.470 0.150 
CPI -0.026 0.043 -0.620 0.541 
IsCountryAAOIFI*** -0.209 0.117 -1.790 0.083 
GDPGrowth -0.327 0.324 -1.010 0.319 
CEODuality -0.216 0.162 -1.340 0.191 
LogSize -0.073 0.064 -1.140 0.262 
Leverage -0.046 0.228 -0.200 0.840 
ROA -0.407 0.504 -0.810 0.425 
IndependentAuditor 0.020 0.034 0.610 0.549 
InternalSAD 0.069 0.171 0.400 0.691 
CrisisDummy -0.012 0.034 -0.340 0.736 
AgeofShariah*** 0.009 0.005 1.840 0.074 
NoofMembers 0.021 0.041 0.510 0.613 
AverageEducation 0.000 0.088 0.000 0.998 
Popularity*** 0.094 0.052 1.790 0.083 
BoardSize -0.005 0.020 -0.270 0.790 
Constant 0.900 0.664 1.360 0.185 
     
No of Obs. 179    
No of Groups 33    
No of Instruments 28    
     
AR(1) 0.122    
AR(2) 0.169    
Hansen Test (p-val)**** 0.338    
Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; **** Since robust standard errors were utilised, we only report Hansen test result.  
The existence of an internal Shari’ah auditing department is the second significant variable for 
the first model. The findings show that having a dedicated Shari’ah auditing department in the 
bank also affects the level of disclosure and suggests that IBs with an internal Shari’ah auditing 
department disclose more (with an amount of 0.167) compared to the IBs without such a 
department in terms of SDIICG score while the existence of an internal Shari’ah auditing 
department is insignificant in terms of the level of disclosure in a SDIAAOIFI score. The positive 
impact of the existence of an internal Shari’ah auditing department may stem from providing 
necessary information and reports to the SB for revision and helping them to compile more 
comprehensive annual reports. While SDIICG contains detailed information over the AAOIFI 
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guidelines, the existence of such a department might facilitate the flow of information to fulfil 
the expectation of such a comprehensive index. This result is also consistent with the empirical 
findings of the literature regarding the positive influence of an internal auditing department 
(Gordon and Smith, 1992; Schneider and Wilner, 1990). Furthermore, this finding suggests 
that regulatory authorities at the state level or independent institutions, such as, AAOIFI should 
pay more attention to the establishment of internal Shari’ah auditing departments to increase 
the level of disclosure. 
As can be seen in Table 12, there are four control variables unique to the second model, namely, 
the Lag of SDIAAOIFI, Regularity Quality, Country AAOIFI and Age of Shariah variables. The 
Lag of SDIAAOIFI has a 5% significance level with a coefficient of 0.416 which shows that 
experience of the previous year influences the next year’s performance. Regularity Quality, 
however, has a small positive impact with a coefficient of 0.007, which suggests that regularity 
quality of a country increases the level of disclosure according to AAOIFI standards, which is 
meaningful since AAOIFI standards for SARs are also part of regularity framework. This result 
is also consistent with the literature in which regulatory quality has a positive impact on the 
disclosure level (Ernstberger and Grüning, 2013; Leuz et al., 2003). This suggests that to 
improve the transparency and level of disclosure at IBs in line with the governance standards 
of AAOIFI, it is also important to consider country-level factors such as regulatory quality and 
strive to develop them further at the country level. Adoption of AAOIFI standards at the country 
level is also significant in the second model as it is expected, as El-Halaby and Hussainey 
(2016) suggested since a formal adoption of AAOIFI standards at country level creates a 
regulatory pressure to comply with the AAOIFI standards at the bank level. The sign of the 
coefficient, however, is negative. Although at first sight, this seems contradictory, when we 
examine Table 6, the reason becomes more obvious. Out of four countries who adopted 
AAOIFI governance standards, while Bahrain and Jordan have a high level of disclosure (0.83 
and 0.81, respectively), Sudan and Qatar perform quite poorly (0.55 and 0.47, respectively). 
On the other hand, counties such as the UAE, South Africa, Lebanon, UK and Malaysia 
perform very well and above 65% despite not adopting AAOIFI standards at the country level. 
This shows that adoption of AAOIFI governance standards at a country level does not yield the 
same result in all cases, as Bahrain and Qatar, while both adopting the standards and being 
neighbouring states, produce very different outcomes in terms of disclosure levels. This 
requires further analysis of country or bank level determinants. As mentioned earlier, one such 
reason might be Shari’ah scholars employed at IBs, and their personal influence in SARs, as 
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all three IBs in Qatar have the same chairman in their SBs. As for the AgeofShariah variable, 
it is significant at 10% significance level with a coefficient of 0.009. This indicates that as the 
IB gets more experience in Shari’ah compliance, it further fulfils the AAOIFI’s guidelines. 
This finding is consistent with those of Cormier et al. (2005) and Hossain and Hammami 
(2009). 
In providing a brief conclusion, Table 13 summarises the results of hypotheses testing process 
by presenting the results together.  
Table 13: Summarising the Results through Hypotheses 
Hypothesis SDIGeneral SDIAAOIFI 
H1: There is a positive relationship between regularity quality of the 
country and level of disclosure in SAR. 
     Rejected Failed to Reject** 
H2: There is a positive relationship between voice and accountability of 
the country and level of disclosure in SAR. 
Rejected Rejected 
H3: There is a positive relationship between corruption index score of 
the country and level of disclosure in SAR. 
Rejected Rejected 
H4: The level of disclosure of SAR is expected to be higher in IBs located 
in countries which adopts AAOIFI standards than in countries that do 
not adopt AAOIFI. 
Rejected Failed to Reject *** 
H5: There is a positive relationship between GDP growth of the country 
and level of disclosure in SAR. 
Rejected Rejected 
H6: SAR of large IBs are more likely to disclose more information than 
small IBs. 
Rejected Rejected 
H7: There is an association between profitability and the level of 
disclosure. Rejected 
Rejected 
H8: There is a positive relationship between leverage of IB and level of 
disclosure in SAR. 
Rejected Rejected 
H9: The level of disclosure of SAR is predicted to be higher in IBs 
audited by the Big 4 auditors than in IBs that are audited by non-Big 4 
auditors 
Rejected Rejected 
H10: There is a positive relationship between existence of internal 




H11: SAR of IBs after the crisis are more likely to disclose more 
information than pre-crisis period. 
Rejected Rejected 
H12: Older IBs are expected to disclose more information in SAR than 
younger IBs. Rejected 
Failed to 
Reject *** 
H13: There is a positive relationship between size of SSB and level of 
disclosure in SAR. 
Rejected Rejected 
H14: There is a positive relationship between average level of education 
of SB members and level of disclosure in SAR. 
Rejected Rejected 
H15: There is a positive relationship between popularity of SSB and level 





H16: There is an association between board size and level of disclosure 
in SAR. 
Rejected Rejected 
H17: There is an association between CEO duality and level of disclosure 
in SAR. 
Rejected Rejected 
Notes: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.0 
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This paper explored and examined the level of disclosure in SARs of 41 IBs from 15 countries 
over an eight-year period, and the factors affecting the level of disclosure. In addition, to assess 
the influence of AAOIFI standards for SAR related disclosure, we constructed two indices, one 
is completely based on AAOIFI standards (SDIA), while the second index (SDIICG) has 16 
additional items to explore regarding whether SARs disclose any further information through 
pro-active behaviour beyond the AAOIFI standards to provide transparency with the objective 
of identifying voluntary disclosure in line with Islamic moral economy expectations. 
Based on the scores of SDIICG and SDIAAOIFI, we can argue that SDIA scores are considerably 
higher than SDIICG, which suggests that published guidelines of AAOIFI standards regarding 
SARs are influential in the preparation of the reports regardless of the commitment of the 
country to AAOIFI standards. Especially, detailed analysis of SARs shows that most of the SBs 
use the template provided by AAOIFI close to mimicry level. Also, for both indices, the results 
demonstrate that there is a gradual increment in disclosure practice year on year within the 
sampled period. Nevertheless, this is not valid for some IBs, since there are some examples 
where the level of disclosure decreases. As for the SDIICG score, in general, it has scored a 
lesser level of disclosure compared to the SDIA. This result suggests that going beyond the 
general statements to inform stakeholders about the activities and Shari’ah compliance issues 
of IBs with the aim of providing transparency as an articulation of IME in the Islamic finance 
sector is highly neglected. Thus, it seems that there are some positive developments in 
voluntary disclosure in the sense of complying with AAOIFI standards for SAR; however, as 
discussed above, ‘substantive morality’ related expectations in IB industry are not fulfilled in 
disclosure practice either. Hence, the recent debate focusing on ‘form vs substance’ indicating 
that IBs have focused on form compliance and neglected the substantive morality in their 
operations seems to be relevant for disclosure practices as well.  
As the discussion on ICG indicates, IBs need to operate within ICG in order to have consistency 
between their Shari’ah complaint operations and their governance structure, which may help 
to overcome the observed problems relating to the lack of substantive morality. Since this study 
aimed at essentialising such a comprehensive understanding of governance in IBs, we 
developed SDIICG beyond the compliance or form oriented nature of AAOIFI standards as 
expressed in SDIA. However, the scores for SDIICG compared to SDIAAOIFI are an indication of 
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the mentioned neglect on substance-related issues even though the index did not impose the 
essential ethical requirement as expected from an Islamic moral economy based ICG. 
It should be noted that the findings of this empirical analysis based on the disclosure analysis 
of SAR is not only a matter of difference between two sets of indices, one being more detailed 
than the other, but, moreover, symptomatic of a serious paradigm shift. This paradigm shift 
refers to a movement from the initial imagination of an Islamic morality-based understanding 
of Islamic economics and finance by the founding fathers, towards a form-oriented everyday 
practice of IBs through the negative screening process applied by the SBs. Disclosure level in 
SARs, in this regard, should be considered as a symptom of this problem and could be treated 
only through the implementation of an IPE theoretical structural framework at the CG level, 
which means adoption of an ICG system as constituted by the substance of IME within the IPE 
structure. 
Regarding content analysis, the SARs revealed two pieces of information. In communicating 
with the shareholders, SBs of some IBs, particularly in Malaysia, remained content with only 
releasing approval of Shari’ah compliance rather than disclosing any further details. This 
indicates that some SBs expect shareholders to maintain full trust in their decision-making 
capabilities. Considering that such limited disclosure practice does not have a negative impact 
on ‘Islamic’ identity of respective IBs, we can argue that they succeed in holding the Islamic 
identity by the mere existence of a SB. Secondly, the example of Bank Al-Khair from Bahrain,  
reveals that the advice of a SB on the operation of an IB might exert  very limited impact on 
the everyday operations. This is an important matter, as considering that the Islamic economics 
movement in its origin aimed to create an alternative system authenticated through Islamic 
ontology, yet IBs, as envisaged to be part of that system, have failed to generate such an 
authentic outcome as discussed in this paper. Such pragmatism has resulted in sluggish 
development in IB patronising even in the Muslim countries. In the largest and relatively 
democratic Muslim countries, namely in Indonesia and Turkey, IBs share in the financial 
system has not moved to a significant level despite the push from the state apparatus. The trust 
in IBs in terms of delivering Islamic solutions as opposed to the form fulfilment has not been 
formed to encourage public to patronage IBs, as the Islamicity of IBs is questioned 
continuously (see, among others: El-Gamal, 2007; Khan, 2010; Asutay, 2012), which partly 
due to unscrupulous practices by the Shari’ah compliancy process through the SSBs as directly 
evidenced by the qualitative evidence (see Section 6.2) in particular. 
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In terms of factors affecting the level of disclosure, we can conclude that the popularity of 
Shari’ah scholars is a significant variable for both SDIICG and SDIA. While the existence of an 
internal Shari’ah auditing department has some explanatory power for SDIICG, it disappears in 
the case of SDIA. On the other hand, we observe four new factors influential in the SDIAAOIFI 
score: lag of dependent variables, adoption of AAOIFI standards at the country level, 
regulatory quality of country and age of Shari’ah compliance which might indicate that these 
four variables are particularly deterministic in terms of complying with AAOIFI standards for 
SARs.  
These results indicate that disclosure of SB members in their annual reports by itself does not 
contain adequate details to convince stakeholders that Shari’ah compliance exists within the 
institution. However, their explicit approval for Shari’ah compliance of the institution in these 
reports without disclosing details of their analysis seems a sufficient condition for the 
stakeholders considering the high growth rate of the Islamic banking sector during last decades. 
Therefore, as future research, it is necessary to explore ifta (legal ruling issuing) as an 
institution, further detailing its historical trajectory to reveal how such trust has been gained 
and whether similar conditions are valid for Shari’ah scholars employed in a modern Islamic 
banking sector today. 
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